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DATA-GENERATING PATENTS 
Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman 
ABSTRACT—Patents and trade secrets are often considered economic 
substitutes. Under this view, inventors can decide either to maintain an 
invention as a trade secret or to seek a patent and disclose to the public the 
details of the invention. However, a handful of scholars have recognized 
that because the patent disclosure requirements are not always rigorous, 
inventors may sometimes be able to keep certain aspects of an invention 
secret, yet still receive a patent to the invention as a whole. Here, we 
provide further insight into how trade secrets and patents may act as 
complements. Specifically, we introduce the concept of “data-generating 
patents,” which refer to patents on inventions involving technologies that 
by design generate valuable data through their operation or use. For 
instance, genetic tests and medical devices produce data about patients. 
Internet search engines and social networking websites generate data about 
the interests of consumers. When data-generating inventions are patented, 
and the patentee enjoys market power over the invention, by implication, 
the patentee also effectively enjoys market power over the data generated 
by the invention. Trade secret law further protects the patentee’s market 
power over the data, even where that data is in a market distinct from the 
patented invention and especially after the patent expires or is invalidated. 
We contend that the use of patents and trade secrets as complements in this 
manner may sometimes yield socially harmful results. We identify the 
conditions under which such results occur and make several 
recommendations to mitigate their effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advances in the aggregation and analysis of large data sets—“big 
data”—are providing a new source of value for many patent holders. For 
example, in the genetic testing space, Myriad Genetics leverages its 
diagnostic patents for breast and ovarian cancer to generate large, 
proprietary databases of patient information.1 As the main provider of these 
genetic testing services, Myriad has amassed detailed clinical data that it 
maintains as a trade secret.2 Even though Myriad’s patents have effectively 
been invalidated, Myriad has gained a strong market advantage through the 
ability to mine this private database of information that its competitors 
cannot.3  
In the information technology realm, Google leverages data generated 
by its patented search technology to afford it a competitive advantage.4 
Specifically, Google utilizes a wealth of information about its users, such 
as previous search queries, locations, social networking data, and other 
personal information, which it may maintain as a trade secret well beyond 
the expiration date of its patents, to improve its current search queries and 
its targeted advertising to those users.5 
In this Article, we introduce the concept of “data-generating patents” 
to describe patents over inventions that generate unique data from users. 
1 See infra notes 96–115 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra notes 96–115 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 96–115 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (issued Sept. 4, 2001) (disclosing the 
method for Google’s “PageRank” search technology). 
5 Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//intl/
en/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/U556-BV2C] (last modified Aug. 
19, 2015). 
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Specifically, these inventions typically generate data that is distinct from 
the operation and use of the invention itself. To be certain, the ordinary use 
of a patented invention will often generate data about the invention that can 
be used to improve the invention itself. For instance, the use of a 
wheelbarrow may lead customers to provide feedback that lead to 
improvements in its design. Indeed, such a feedback mechanism often lies 
at the heart of technological progress.6 In contrast, data-generating 
inventions by their operation and use may generate large amounts of data 
beyond the invention itself—for instance, data about users, other persons, 
or even the world in general—that can then be used to improve the 
operation of the invention or employed in a field entirely distinct from the 
invention.7  
Unlike information about the invention itself—which is often 
disclosed in patented improvements on the original invention—data-
generating inventions tend to produce data that can be maintained as a trade 
secret. Patent holders enjoy an increased ability to aggregate and analyze 
“big data” obtained through leveraging data-generating patents, and they 
can protect the results using trade secret protection. This presents unique 
legal and economic consequences that we contend may be socially 
problematic under certain conditions. In addition to enjoying the potentially 
indefinite scope of protection afforded by trade secret law for the generated 
data, inventors of data-generating patents need not be concerned with the 
risk of ordinary defenses to trade secret infringement, such as independent 
discovery or reverse engineering, while the patent on the underlying 
invention is in effect.8 Even after the patent term ends, the data-generating 
patent holder may continue to benefit from the de jure lead time advantage 
secured by the prior patent in its compilation of data.9 
Myriad’s data-generating patents over breast cancer diagnostic tests 
and Google’s search engine patents illustrate these concerns. The exclusive 
lead time afforded by patent protection has given Myriad a competitive 
6 See Karen E. Lee, Note, Cooperative Standard-Setting: The Road to Compatibility or Deadlock? 
The NAFTA’s Transformation of the Telecommunications Industry, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 487, 490 
(1996) (“Manufacturers use consumer feedback to improve upon a technology.”). 
7 Of course, all inventions in some rough sense “generate . . . data beyond the invention itself.” For 
instance, the sale of a patented pharmaceutical may generate a list of physicians who regularly prescribe 
the drug and a list of patients who regularly take the drug. However, unlike data-generating inventions, 
such data is not generated, by design, through the operation and use of the invention. As such, data-
generating inventions are a unique subset of inventions. See infra Part II. 
8 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974). 
9 Cf. Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 676 (1988) (concluding that the initial patent holder has 
an “advantage over competitors having to start ‘from scratch’ to develop the product”). 
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advantage in generating a massive database of patient information 
protected by trade secrecy. Myriad’s database will be extremely difficult 
for competitors to recreate so as to compete effectively, despite the 
Supreme Court’s recent invalidation of many of Myriad’s patent claims.10 
The inability for the market to self-correct this informational imbalance 
allows Myriad to extend its market power even after patent protection 
ends.11 Similarly, the evidence suggests that Google has been able to 
leverage its patented search technology to obtain a competitive advantage 
in gathering data.12 Google’s ability to capture information about its users, 
and to continue using this proprietary information after its patents expire or 
are invalidated, provides it the ability not only to improve its search 
functionality, but also to leverage its proprietary data to create a superior 
product in the distinct market of targeted online advertising.13  
Our discussion of the potentially problematic uses of data-generating 
patents is subject to two important qualifications. First, we do not doubt 
that other aspects and practices of technology companies—such as 
technological “lock-in,” tying, collusion, resale price maintenance, reverse 
payments, and network effects—can lead to similar anticompetitive effects 
when a company enjoys market power.14 These concerns are typically 
considered by antitrust law.15 However, ordinary patent enforcement—that 
is, enforcement absent these other sorts of market practices—is often 
viewed as an “exception” to traditional antitrust scrutiny, or at least 
typically outside of antitrust’s regulatory ambit.16 In this regard, patent law 
generally uses internal doctrines to determine the appropriate reach of a 
patent, and although we address antitrust law when appropriate, we tend to 
10 See infra Section II.A.1. 
11 See infra Section II.A.1. 
12 See infra Section II.A.2. 
13 Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/apps/intl/en/terms/user_terms.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GQN-7AU3]; see Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the 
Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 407 (2014) (explaining that Google is able to “extract 
ever more precise information about users to allow advertisers to more effectively target particular ads 
to those users”); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 942–43 (2014). 
14 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK LEMLEY & MARK JANIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (2009); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and 
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885 (2003). 
15 See HOVENKAMP, LEMLEY & JANIS, supra note 14; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 14, at 885. 
16 See William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic 
Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 312 (1966) (“It is convenient to describe the patentee’s freedom to 
monopolize as an ‘exception’ to the antitrust laws’ general mandate of competitive behavior . . . .”); see 
also Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 
1215–16 (2000).  
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employ a patent policy-centric lens in evaluating the concerns of data-
generating patents.17  
Second, companies often use a variety of means to aggregate 
proprietary data.18 For instance, it is clear that Google’s patents today are 
not the predominant mechanism by which Google maintains a competitive 
advantage in generating its user search queries.19 Nonetheless, as we 
explain below, we believe that patents did play an important role for 
Google early in its history.20 Importantly, as long as data-generating patents 
exhibit some nontrivial detrimental effect on the market, they deserve 
examination and potential remediation, even if they play a relatively minor 
role in a given company’s mix of tools and practices used to gain a market 
advantage.21  
Not all data-generating patents pose policy concerns. Yet, identifying 
ex ante which data-generating patents are likely to create high potential 
social costs will typically be too difficult. So we offer two criteria that can 
be used to make such a determination ex post: (1) the extent of expansion 
into unforeseeable data markets and (2) the strength of preempting 
potential competition in markets for the generated data.22  
The “unforeseeable data markets” factor concerns the patent holder’s 
ability to generate data in an area that is not directly related to the market 
covered by the patented invention.23 If the invention allows aggregation of 
17 See O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1196. One exception is the so-called patent misuse doctrine, 
which tends to draw on antitrust principles to render a patent unenforceable when a patent holder 
engages in certain anticompetitive behaviors. See id. at 1195. We address potential misuse concerns of 
data-generating patents in Sections II.B.3 and III.B.1. 
18 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1179–86 (2008). 
19 See J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the 
Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 454 (2006); infra Section II.A. 
20 See infra Section II.A. 
21 Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 1439, 1492 (1974) (noting that a particular market practice “has genuine economic 
significance, as contrasted with transitory business significance, only to the extent that nontrivial 
barriers to entry into the industry in question can be said to exist” (emphasis in original)). 
22 As we discuss below, although there are other factors that may be useful, we believe these two 
factors do the majority of the work in determining whether a given data-generating patent is likely to be 
problematic. See infra Sections III.A.1–4. 
23 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work 
Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1527–29 (2013) (“Unless carefully cabined to the kinds of foreseeable 
markets exemplified by the definitional derivatives, [copyright] can unduly restrain competition and 
follow-on innovation, as well as interfere with free-expression interests of subsequent creators.”); 
Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949, 995–96, 1004–
07 (2015) (contending that patent “[c]laims to general concepts such as the hedging of risk, 
unconstrained by any methods of implementation, are problematic for reasons similar to functional 
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data in unforeseeable secondary markets, as we explain further in the 
Article, the economic effects of the patent will more likely be 
problematic.24 For instance, Google’s use of its aggregated search data 
derived from its patented search algorithms is potentially more problematic 
in our view when used to target customized advertising to users than when 
used to improve the algorithms per se.25  
The preemption factor relates to the magnitude of the preemptive 
effect of the data-generating patent on competition in the market regarding 
the data. The more likely the data-generating patent forecloses competitors 
from generating similar data, the more likely the invention will be found 
problematic. For example, Myriad’s data-generating patents foreclosed 
other methods of identifying mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
for breast and ovarian cancer screening.26 Economically detrimental effects 
from these patents are likely to present a greater concern on balance.  
For those data-generating patents that are likely problematic, we 
discuss several proposals to mitigate their detrimental effects when they 
occur.27 Because identifying problematic patents accurately ex ante will 
likely be difficult, we tend to prefer ex post solutions as a general matter. 
For the ex ante solutions we discuss—which include limiting patent term 
and narrowing patentable subject matter—we are concerned not only about 
error costs but also about an increased preference for trade secrecy that 
may result. Similarly, requiring disclosure of data might raise fewer of 
these concerns, though the effect on innovation incentives and monitoring 
challenges make such solutions less than ideal. For the ex post proposals, 
such as broadening exceptions for reverse engineering, independent 
invention, and experimental use, and perhaps limiting injunctive relief, we 
are more sanguine if courts could narrowly fashion these remedies. 
Similarly, agencies could also institute disclosure-related solutions. Each 
potential solution has possibly significant limitations. We believe, however, 
that any solution would benefit from detailed empirical study and further 
discussion. 
In addition to our policy-driven analysis, we also make an original 
observation regarding the theoretical role patents play relative to trade 
secrets. Patent and trade secret law share the same goal of promoting 
biotechnology claims: they cover a large number of avenues of further development, including some 
that might be unforeseeable and quite transformative”).  
24 See infra Section III.A. 
25 See infra Section III.A. 
26 See infra Section III.A. 
27 See infra Section III.B. 
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innovation.28 Ordinarily, patents and trade secrets are considered economic 
substitutes.29 In other words, inventors decide between patent and trade 
secret options in a way that maximizes protection for the invention.30 In 
some circumstances, however, no choice needs to be made—trade secrets 
and patents function as economic complements.31 In particular, limitations 
in the disclosure requirements of patent law allow inventors to keep some 
features of their inventions secret.32 Moreover, inventors are under no duty 
to update their disclosures after they file for a patent application.33 Besides 
the important policy questions posed by data-generating patents, they are a 
unique example of patents and trade secrets as economic complements that 
has not been previously identified in the scholarly literature.34 Unlike prior 
discussions of the complementary roles patents and trade secrets may play, 
data-generating patents can produce trade secrets in distinct product 
markets and even after the patent expires or is invalidated.35  
In sum, our Article makes three important contributions to the 
literature. First, we provide strong evidence for an important class of 
inventions to rebut the standard view that patents and trade secrets merely 
act as economic substitutes.36 Second, we identify, explain, and coin the 
notion of data-generating patents, which had only been described 
incompletely in the previous literature.37 Third, we describe the conditions 
28 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1974); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual 
Property and the Property Rights Movement, REG., Fall 2007, at 36, 38. 
29 See, e.g., Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical 
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 136 (2010) (explaining the traditional view). 
30 See id. 
31 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated, 
486 U.S. 800 (1988); see Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1494 (2002).  
32 See infra Section II.B. 
33 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret 
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 395–96 (2002); 
Roy E. Hofer & L. Ann Fitzgerald, New Rules for Old Problems: Defining the Contours of the Best 
Mode Requirement in Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2309, 2337 (1995). 
34 See infra Part II. 
35 See infra Part II. By “distinct product markets,” we generally refer to the usage in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, which found separate markets to 
exist if there is enough consumer demand for the products to be sold separately. 466 U.S. 2, 21–22 
(1984), overruled on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
36 See infra Parts I–II (discussing the standard explanation of patents and trade secrets as substitutes 
and introducing and describing “data-generating patents” respectively). 
37 See infra Part II. Other scholars have recognized that patents on medical diagnostic tests may 
allow for the control of information generated by the patented tests as a trade secret. See Dan L. Burk, 
Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 233, 233–49 (2015) 
(providing a general theory of how patent holders in the field of personalized medicine can generate 
massive databases of patient information protected by trade secret law); John M. Conley et al., Myriad 
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under which data-generating patents may be socially detrimental, and offer 
and analyze a variety of potential solutions.38  
I. PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS:
FROM SUBSTITUTES TO COMPLEMENTS
Patents and trade secrets are traditionally considered economic 
substitutes: if one decides to patent an invention, one must disclose the 
details of the invention and forgo trade secret protection.39 However, a 
handful of scholars have recognized that patents and trade secrets may 
sometimes act as economic complements, because patent law does not 
always require full disclosure of the invention.40 In order to place our 
description of data-generating patents in a suitable theoretical context, we 
briefly describe these two views of the relationship between patents and 
trade secrets. 
A. The Majority View: Patents as “Substitutes” for Trade Secrets
The standard view portrays patents and trade secrets as economic
substitutes, namely two mutually exclusive forms of intellectual property 
protection from which an innovator must ultimately select only one for a 
given invention.41 In short, commentators have largely suggested that 
After Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 597, 616–17 (2014) (describing 
Myriad’s proprietary database strategy); Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic 
Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585 (2013) (cataloguing concerns 
regarding the retention of information generated by medical diagnostic tests as trade secrets). However, 
unlike the treatment in this Article, these scholars have limited their inquiry to the area of personalized 
medicine. See Burk, supra, at 233–49; Cook-Deegan et al., supra, at 585–87. In this regard, while 
Burk’s analysis of Myriad’s patented genetic tests is similar in some ways to ours, we conceived of, 
publicly presented, and drafted that portion of this Article prior to the presentation or dissemination of 
Burk’s article. See Dennis Crouch, Twenty Thoughts on the Importance of Myriad, PATENTLY-O (June 
14, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/myriad.html [https://perma.cc/ 
WR4K-UECF] (“Brenda Simon . . . notes that Myriad ‘does not impact one of the most valuable 
aspects made possible through Myriad’s patent protection: a private biobank of patient data containing 
information about additional mutations that Myriad can maintain as a trade secret.’”); Ted Sichelman & 
Brenda Simon, Generating Trade Secrets From Patents, Presentation at the 14th IP Scholars 
Conference, Berkeley, California (Aug. 7, 2014). More importantly, in contrast to these biomedical-
focused works, we introduce the broad concept of “data-generating patents” and explain how they apply 
across numerous technology types and industries. See infra Sections II.A–C. Additionally, unlike the 
prior literature, we provide a general analytical framework to distinguish problematic from 
unproblematic data-generating patents and offer and assess numerous prescriptive options to remedy 
any potentially detrimental effects. See infra Part III.  
38 See infra Part III. 
39 See infra Section I.A.  
40 See infra Section I.B.  
41 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 917, 923–24 (2011); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 314 
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patenting essentially destroys trade secret protection, because patents 
nominally require disclosure of the underlying invention sufficient to 
enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention.42 Gideon 
Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman aptly describe the traditional view: “As 
a substitute for patent protection, trade secrecy presents businesses with a 
choice between patent and trade secret protection. While firms can elect 
either option, they cannot employ both modes to protect the same 
information.”43 
More precisely, patents are an intellectual property right that prevents 
others from making, using, importing, selling, or offering for sale the 
patented invention for a period of twenty years from the date of patent 
application.44 In exchange for this exclusionary right, the so-called “quid 
pro quo” of patent law is the disclosure of the invention in the patent 
document so as to increase the storehouse of public knowledge.45 The 
typical rationale for such an exchange is utilitarian: in order to promote 
innovation, society is willing to impart a limited-time legal monopoly to 
the inventor in exchange for, at least in part, the knowledge about the 
invention, freely available to the public after the term of the patent has 
expired.46 
The patent–trade secret substitute story is nuanced, however. The 
types of subject matter that may be patented are both broader and narrower 
than what can be covered by a trade secret.47 In essence, any commercially 
valuable information that may be kept secret can be eligible for trade 
secrecy protection.48 Patentable subject matter, on the other hand, consists 
(2008); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 624 
(2013).  
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 1494. To be 
certain, nobody disputes that trade secrecy may be used to protect the ideas and information prior to the 
patenting process. See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 136 n.137. The question of primary 
theoretical concern, however, is whether trade secrecy continues to play a role after patenting. See id. 
43 Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 1494. 
44 §§ 271, 154(a)(2). 
45 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); see also Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 546 (2012). 
46 See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 129, 130–33 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  
47 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive 
Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1685 (2009). 
48 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) defines a “trade secret” as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or
process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
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only of a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” that 
does not constitute an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena, 
regardless of whether the invention can be kept secret if used 
commercially.49 Moreover, the claimed invention must also be novel and 
nonobvious,50 whereas old and obvious subject matter may be covered by a 
trade secret as long as it is not publicly known.51   
So patents and trade secrets are only substitutes to the extent that the 
subject matter can either be patented or potentially kept a secret.52 For this 
overlapping subject matter, the substitute theory posits that the description 
of the invention in the patent eliminates any protection under trade secret 
law.53 Specifically, a patent application must disclose sufficient detail (1) to 
satisfy the written description requirement that the inventor demonstrate 
“possession” of the claimed invention and (2) to enable a person of skill in 
the art to make and use the invention.54 As a consequence of these 
disclosure requirements—coupled with trade secret law’s requirement to 
maintain any protected information as secret—under the substitution 
theory, one may not obtain both trade secret and patent rights.55 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1985); see also ROGER M. MILGRIM 
& ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed. 2015). 
49 § 101; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) 
(excluding inventions from eligibility unless they are sufficiently applied). 
50 §§ 102, 103; DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 3.01, 5.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 
2013). 
51 See, e.g., JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 4.03 (Law Journal Seminars-Press 2015); Jason Mazzone & Matthew Moore, 
The Secret Life of Patents, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 41–42 (2008). 
52 Cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent 
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 103–04 (“[I]ncreasing the effectiveness of disclosure will be unlikely to 
have a significant impact on incentives to invent because disclosure has an inherently greater impact on 
inventions that could have been maintained as trade secrets.”). 
53 See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 136. 
54 § 112(a).   
55 Moreover, there is a legal incentive to obtain patent protection rather than maintain trade secrets, 
because (at least historically) a prior inventor using the invention as a trade secret would not invalidate, 
but would infringe, the patent of a later inventor on the same invention. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. 
v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing &
Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). Following passage of the America Invents Act (AIA),
some commentators have argued that the Metallizing doctrine has been eliminated, though the majority
scholarly view appears to be that it persists. See Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same
Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1122–24 (2015); Dmitry Karshtedt, The Riddle of
Secret Public Use: A Response to Professor Lemley, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 159, 161 (2015).
Everyone agrees the AIA has erected a limited prior user defense to infringement for trade secrets used
commercially in a manufacturing process more than one year prior to the filing of an applicable patent
filed after September 16, 2011, but such a narrow defense is unlikely to change the patent–trade secret
decision calculus in most instances. § 273 (expanding the prior use defense under previous law).
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The substitution model has many implications for intellectual property 
theory and practice. For instance, which form of protection the inventor 
seeks out depends upon the salient features and consequences of patent and 
trade secret protection to the invention at hand.56 Inventors and firms will 
typically consider the duration of protection, likelihood of reverse 
engineering, likelihood of independent invention, detectability of 
infringement, and the cost of procuring and enforcing the rights inherent in 
the protection sought.57 For example, patent protection may be an easier 
choice for mechanical and electrical inventions because they have generally 
been more prone to reverse engineering than other types of inventions, such 
as manufacturing processes for biologics.58 These and other details of 
substitution theory, however, are not particularly important for our 
discussion here. As such, we turn next to critiques of the theory.  
B. The Minority View: Patents and Trade Secrets as Complements
Several scholars, including one of us, have previously questioned the
standard view that patents and trade secrets are merely substitutes.59 
Despite the black letter rule that an inventor “can lawfully claim only what 
he has invented and described,”60 the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
(USPTO) and the courts typically allow patent claims that are much 
broader than what is actually disclosed in a patent application.61 
56 See David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade 
Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 62–63 (1991); Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of 
Inventions Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV. L. REV. 807, 821 (1974). 
57 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 33, at 377–401; Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1545 (2005); Schwartz, supra note 41, at 630–31.  
58 See, e.g., ANDREW RUDGE, GUIDE TO EUROPEAN PATENTS § 8:4 (2008) (“Just as chemical 
products reveal their secrets on chemical analysis, so mechanical products can reveal their mechanism 
on dismantling or reverse-engineering, and the sequence of commands behind a computer programs 
[sic] can be decoded.”); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the 
Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 376 (1992) (“It is well-known, for instance, that process 
inventions are easier to keep secret than product inventions.”); Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade 
Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 696–98 (1996) 
(noting that electrical and mechanical inventions are often easy to reverse engineer); W. Nicholson 
Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing trade secret protection 
for manufacturing processes of patented biologics). 
59 See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 136. 
60 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 62, 121 (1853); see CHISUM, supra note 50, § 1.03[2][b]; 
see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268 
(1977).  
61 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 66–68 (2008) (describing biotechnology and software patent 
claims that greatly exceeded the scope of the disclosed invention); Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499–1500 (2001) (explaining how the 
USPTO is unable to adequately examine each patent and grants many broad patents as a result). 
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Specifically, a patent will usually disclose just one or a few tangible 
“embodiments” of the invention in the patent’s specification, but will often 
claim thousands of different embodiments in a claim.62 This result is due in 
substantial part to the courts’ and Patent Office’s relatively lax 
implementation of the written description and enablement requirements.63 
For instance, Myriad’s patents related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
covered numerous cancer-associated variants of these genes but disclosed 
only a small subset of those variants in the patent specifications 
themselves.64 
More recently, disclosure standards have been watered down even 
further by the essential elimination of the “best mode” requirement from 
patenting, which requires the inventor to disclose those details—such as 
temperature and pressure ranges, height and width, and similar 
parameters—that optimize the invention.65 However, under the recently 
passed America Invents Act, although best mode is still a nominal 
requirement for patenting, failure to disclose it can no longer serve as a 
basis to invalidate or render a patent unenforceable.66 Because a patent 
62 Indeed, Jeffrey Lefstin views modern claims as potentially covering “an infinite variety of 
embodiments.” Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1169 (2008). 
63 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1168 (2002); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845–46 (1990).
64 U.S. Patent Nos. 5,747,282 (issued May 5, 1998); 5,693,473 (issued Dec. 2, 1997); 5,837,492 
(issued Nov. 17, 1998). To be certain, disclosure standards are often more rigorous in the biomedical 
fields, especially in the courts. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). Nonetheless, as the Myriad patents illustrate, even in these fields, a patent disclosure typically 
contains far fewer examples than what is covered by the claims. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The 
Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 637 (2010) (describing problems with 
disclosure, including how patent applicants have “develop[ed] various claim drafting schemes so as to 
maximize the breadth of a claim based on certain illustrative, or sometimes a modicum of, disclosure” 
in the specification (quoting C. Leon Kim, Transition from Central to Peripheral Definition Patent 
Claim Interpretation System in Korea, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 404 (1995))). 
65 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (The inventor is to “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor 
or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”); see Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and 
Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and 
a Plea for Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 278 (1997) (stating 
that the best mode requirement requires inventors “reveal to the public the preferred implementations of 
their inventions and . . . information that is material to the patentability of an invention”); see also 
Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (discussing how inventors can “disclose only minimal parts of their inventions” and “thereby 
hide the commercial value that resides in the best mode of practicing their inventions and gain the 
benefit of both the exclusionary right of the patent and the ‘quasi trade secret’ of the best mode”). 
66 1 LESTER HORWITZ & ETHAN HORWITZ, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRACTICE § 71[H] 
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2015) (“Section 15 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act does not 
eliminate the [best mode] requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112 . . . but does amend 35 U.S.C. § 282 . . . to 
provide that the failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent 
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examiner will generally be unable to detect failure to disclose best mode, it 
is on some accounts largely a dead letter and, at best, severely weakened in 
effect.67 
The result of these fairly weak disclosure rules is that a patent 
applicant can often secure a patent without disclosing all of the 
technologically and commercially important details of an invention. This 
withheld knowledge can in turn be protected under trade secret law.68 One 
very common example of this practice is that inventors can typically retain 
software source code as a trade secret, yet still obtain a patent.69 In another 
example, Pilkington Glass used patents and trade secrets to protect codified 
and tacit elements of the company’s “float glass” invention, a radical 
improvement in creating smooth glass.70 Thus, contrary to the standard 
view, patents and trade secrets can simultaneously serve as economic 
complements.71 
Additionally, an inventor need not—in fact, cannot—update the 
disclosure during the prosecution of the patent application in front of the 
Patent Office.72 Thus, if an inventor files a patent early in the R&D process, 
the disclosed best mode of making and using the invention may greatly 
differ from the ultimate commercial embodiment.73 So even if inventors 
may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.”). See generally Brian J. Love & 
Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2012) (explaining that 
the AIA may yield the unintended securing of protection through both patent and trade secret law). 
67 Marc A. McClain, Who Are the New “Best Mode” Police? An Analysis of Proposed New 
Methods of Enforcement of the Best Mode Requirement After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
46 U. TOL. L. REV. 191, 219 (2014). 
68 See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1063, 1086–88 (2008) (“[B]ecause the enablement and written description requirements are weak, . . . a 
patentee may often be able to patent an invention and keep its ‘secret sauce’ a trade secret.”). 
69 See Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection—Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret 
Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 151, 163–65 (1987) (noting that patent law does not require 
the disclosure of software code).  
70 See United States v. Pilkington PLC, No. CV 94-345, 1994 WL 750645 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 
1994). 
71 See Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 215, 230
(2005) (“Trade secret law thus fills an important void, creating that incentive and thereby acting as both 
a complement to and competitor for patent law.”); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, 
Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1947, 1974 (2005) (“First, prosecutors and inventors strategically choose narrow claims . . . because the 
inventor decides to seek a mix of patent and trade secret protection.”); Elisabetta Ottoz & Franco 
Cugno, Choosing the Scope of Trade Secret Law When Secrets Complement Patents, 31 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 219 (2011) (presenting an economic model wherein trade secrets and patents can serve as 
complements). 
72 See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2012). 
73 See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 807 (1988) (“[T]he innovation will in all likelihood be different in 
significant respects from the invention due to the changes necessary to turn the invention into a 
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disclose all of the details of the invention at the time of filing, they may 
retain later discovered details—such as optimal working conditions—as a 
trade secret.74 In fact, knowing as much—and given the weak disclosure 
requirements in the first instance—a common strategy is to file early on the 
concept in order to retain commercial know-how learned after filing as a 
trade secret.75 Indeed, inventions need not be commercialized to garner 
protection under the patent laws.76 Instead, an adequate written disclosure 
of the invention suffices to “reduc[e] the invention to practice.”77 In this 
regard, there is often a wide gulf between a patent disclosure that can 
satisfy the written description, enablement, and best mode disclosure 
requirements78 and the documents that are actually used to build 
commercial products.79 Thus, as a patented product or method evolves 
through the commercialization cycle, information generated by its owner, 
sellers, and consumers about the invention can be retained as a trade secret, 
again supporting the complements view.80 
II. THE USES AND UNIQUENESS OF DATA-GENERATING PATENTS
The use of patents and trade secrets as complements discussed in Part
I focused on information about the invention itself that could be retained as 
a secret.81 For instance, a patentee may keep secret the fact that its patented 
process for baking clay works best at 451 degrees Fahrenheit or that a 
commercial product.”); Dennis Crouch, The Trade Secret Value of Early Patent Filing, PATENTLY-O 
(Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/the-trade-secre.html [https://perma.cc/
HF7D-49JF] (“[M]any if not most patent applications are filed well before the associated product or 
method is ready for public consumption – before the inventor knows the best commercially viable 
mode.”).  
74 See Chisum, supra note 65, at 283; Steven B. Walmsley, Best Mode: A Plea to Repair or 
Sacrifice This Broken Requirement of United States Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
125, 134 (2002). 
75 Cf. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557–58 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(Rich, J.) (noting the benefits of filing early and avoiding disclosure of improvements of the invention). 
76 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (finding that a patent is not 
unenforceable merely because the patentee neglected to put it to commercial use and that it is “the 
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive”); Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 355 (2010) (“[T]he patent laws do not require 
inventions to be in a commercialized form to garner protection.”). 
77 See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 128 
(2009). 
78 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
79 See CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Enablement does 
not require an inventor to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial marketplace.”).  
80 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 1494 (“[T]rade secret law applies to 
unpatentable as well as patentable information. Consequently, trade secrecy serves both as a 
complement to and substitute for patent protection.”).   
81 See supra Section I.B. 
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customer determined that the clay is optimally heated for four minutes and 
thirty-three seconds.82 Surely inventors have gathered information about 
patented inventions and subsequently kept it secret since the origins of the 
patent system.83 
“Data-generating patents” differ from the traditional use of patents 
and trade secrets as complements in that the inventions covered by these 
patents—by definition—often generate information apart from the 
invention itself. In economic terms, data-generating inventions may yield 
information in distinct product markets.84 This information—which is 
typically protectable as a trade secret—may be used to improve the 
invention itself or in an entirely different manner.85 For instance, search-
engine technology may generate data about its users, which can then be 
used to improve the operation of the search engine or to determine market 
trends, or for any number of other uses, such as advertising to users.86   
Data-generating inventions per se are not new. Indeed, the invention 
of various writing instruments and research tools throughout history has 
generated unfathomable amounts of information unrelated to the invention 
itself.87 Nonetheless, our notion of data-generating patents is a newly 
recognized form of patents and trade secrets functioning as economic 
complements.88 In this regard, data-generating patents have become of 
particular note in the current era of big data, in which technology now 
allows for low-cost data storage, retrieval, and analysis.89 Whereas the 
82 N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that an 
inventor need not disclose information that is not related to the operation of the claimed invention to 
satisfy the best mode requirement). 
83 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 1494; Ted Sichelman et al., Retracing the 
Origins of the Patent System (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (stating that public records 
of petitions for patents in the Venetian system contained concise summaries of the invention that were 
not generally updated during examination). 
84 See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: 
Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 
614 (1993) (“If there is no substitution to the new product, then the products represent distinct 
markets.”). 
85 See infra Section II.A. 
86 See infra Section II.A.  
87 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 3,013,467 (filed Nov. 7, 1957) (issued Dec. 19, 1961) (disclosing 
electronic microscope); 6,934,574 (filed June 20, 2002) (issued Aug. 23, 2005) (disclosing MRI 
scanner). 
88 See supra Section I.B. 
89 See, e.g., Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536 (2014) (“[M]any 
experts believe that [big data] will soon lead the way to new frontiers in science and innovation.” 
(internal citations omitted)); W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 
419, 436 (2015) (“The wealth of data available in electronic health records of patients suffering from 
different ailments and responding to drugs they take for other purposes may be mined by big-data 
algorithms, which can suggest new uses.”); Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy 
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Library of Alexandria could at best catalog its scrolls by subject, author, 
title, or a few lines of text—a method of indexing prevalent until fairly 
recently90—Google and other search engines can effectively catalog not 
only at the granular level of words and phrases, but also by the very 
concepts represented by those words and phrases.91 Whereas Ben 
Franklin’s yearly updated almanac catalogued and analyzed hundreds of 
pages of information for practical use,92 artificially intelligent algorithms 
can now scan and analyze millions of pages in seconds and draw new 
associations from them.93   
These rapid changes in the nature and uses of data present unique 
social and economic concerns, particularly for innovation and 
competition.94 These concerns are amplified when patent protection is used 
to provide legal exclusivity—which can often lead to market power—for a 
data-generating invention.95 In particular, the owner of a market power-
conferring, data-generating patent can use its legal rights to enjoy an 
advantage not only in the product market of the invention, but also in the 
market for the information generated by the invention. In this regard, unlike 
trade secrecy, reverse engineering or independent invention is no defense to 
patent infringement. Thus, data-generating patentees are presented with no 
Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 77 (2014) (“Big data refers not only to the collection and 
storage of extremely large data sets but also the data mining and predictive analytic routines that 
process the data . . . .”). 
90 See ANN BLAIR, TOO MUCH TO KNOW: MANAGING SCHOLARLY INFORMATION BEFORE THE 
MODERN AGE 16 (2010); WILLIAM S. PIERCE, FURNISHING THE LIBRARY INTERIOR 68 (1980). 
91 See generally Cynthia L. Barrett, Book Review, 2 NAT’L ACAD. OF ELDER LAW ATTORNEYS J. 7 
(2006) (reviewing ANDREW WEIL, HEALTHY AGING (2005)); JOSEPH B. MILLER, INTERNET 
TECHNOLOGIES AND INFORMATION SERVICES 372 (2d ed. 2014). 
92 See, e.g., RICHARD SAUNDERS, POOR RICHARD, 1733: AN ALMANACK (Benjamin Franklin prtg. 
1732) (spanning less than thirty pages).  
93 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 84 (2013); Stephen F. DeAngelis, Artificial 
Intelligence: How Algorithms Make Systems Smart, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/artificial-intelligence-algorithms-2/ [https://perma.cc/CUG7-
KVWV].  
94 See infra Part III. 
95 See infra Part III. By “market power,” we refer to the standard understanding that such power is 
measured by a firm’s ability to increase a product’s prices “without losing a significant fraction of its 
sales.” Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 43, 44 (1993); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 212–13 (1986). Although there is 
some disagreement over exactly what this understanding entails, our analysis here would not change 
under alternative definitions. Cf. Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 17) (on file with authors) (questioning “the 
proposition that patents always or even typically confer market power”). See generally Alan J. Daskin 
& Lawrence Wu, Observations on the Multiple Dimensions of Market Power, ANTITRUST, Summer 
2005, at 53.  
111:377 (2017) Data-Generating Patents 
393 
risk of independent discovery or reverse engineering while the patent on 
the underlying invention is in effect. Moreover, once the patent term ends, 
or even if the patent is invalidated, the holder continues to enjoy legal 
exclusivities afforded by trade secret law and its potentially indefinite term 
of protection. Beyond its legal rights, the data-generating patentee may also 
benefit from the de jure lead time advantage secured by the prior patent in 
its compilation of data. These potential economic consequences of data-
generating patents were not contemplated in the delicate balance erected by 
the patent system and, as we explain below, can—like big data more 
generally—potentially cause major social and economic harm. 
Before turning to these potential harms, we describe the unique nature 
of data-generating patents in more detail. Data-generating patents appear in 
areas ranging from genetic testing and medical devices to internet search 
and social networking. In some circumstances, the data acquired, 
aggregated, and analyzed through the use of the patented invention may be 
more valuable than the patent itself. The first Section of this Part describes 
the use of data-generating patents in two areas: genetic testing and internet 
search. It then briefly describes many other technological areas in which 
data-generating patents play a role. We conclude by explaining how data-
generating patents function as a form of intellectual property in which 
patents and trade secrets function as economic complements in a unique 
manner. In contrast to previously recognized examples, data-generating 
patents may yield trade secrets in different product markets and well after 
the term of the patent expires or the patent is invalidated. 
A. The Rise of Data-Generating Patents
1. From Patents to Proprietary Databases of Genetic Disease
Markers.—The value of trade secrets obtained through data-
generating patents is particularly evident in the area of genetic testing, 
particularly the generation of proprietary databases of patients’ genetic 
information derived from patented diagnostic tests. Most notably, Myriad 
Genetics had been the sole provider in the United States of testing for the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which are markers for breast cancer.96 Myriad 
collects and stores information from its patients about variations, 
96 See infra note 99; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013); Ashley McHugh, Note, Invalidating Gene Patents: Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 187 (2010).
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phenotypes, populations, and family histories.97 Over 1.5 million patients 
have used and contributed data to Myriad’s BRCA testing services.98  
Until recently, Myriad’s status as the sole testing provider for these 
genes was based, at least in part, on its strong assertion of its patent rights.99 
Before the Supreme Court’s recent decision invalidating some of its patent 
claims, Myriad had the exclusive ability to collect clinical data from 
patients as a result of its patent protection for over a decade, maintaining 
their information in a private database.100  
Myriad usually provides three types of test results when comparing a 
patient’s genetic information with a naturally occurring genetic sequence: 
no variations, harmless variations, or mutations that are clearly harmful.101 
For the first two types, no variations or harmless variations, the difference 
between the patient’s sequence and the naturally occurring sequence does 
not indicate an increased susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancer.102 For 
the third type, where the mutations are clearly harmful, the patient is at 
increased risk for developing cancer.103 
Occasionally, however, the test results are more complicated to 
understand.104 For variants of unknown significance (VUS), the effects of 
the variations are difficult to interpret, so it is unclear whether the patient is 
at increased risk of cancer.105 Myriad states that the portion of patients with 
97 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 585 (describing Myriad’s “extensive database that 
relates variants of uncertain significance to phenotype, details their frequency in various populations 
and includes genetic studies on patient families”). 
98 See History, MYRIAD, https://www.myriad.com/about-myriad/inside-myriad/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DZ6-TGM2]. 
99 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 585 (“[Myriad’s] status as the sole commercial 
provider of BRCA testing in the United States is a consequence of its exclusive US patent rights.”). 
Myriad’s vigorous enforcement strategy was unusual among patent holders of biomedical technologies 
at the time. See Christopher Heaney et al., The Perils of Taking Property Too Far, 1 STAN. J.L. SCI. & 
POL’Y 46 (2009); Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and 
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 299 (2007); Brenda M. 
Simon, Patent Cover-Up, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1308 (2011).  
100  Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2111–14. 
101 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 585.  
102 See generally CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., UNDERSTANDING GENETIC TESTS FOR BREAST AND 




103 See id. at 21. 
104 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 585 (explaining that “variants of unknown 
significance” are “difficult to interpret”). See generally CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., supra note 102, at 
21 (explaining that if a patient receives an uncertain variant result, “it is not clear currently if the 
variation is harmless, or if it is a variation that is making the gene faulty”).  
105 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 585. 
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unknown variations is only 3%.106 For most BRCA testing carried out by 
other companies in Europe, where Myriad’s patents have not been strongly 
enforced, the portion of cases resulting in unknown variations is as high as 
20%.107 Myriad’s lower unknown variation rate results from its ability to 
interpret its results in light of its very large, proprietary database.108 Myriad 
builds and maintains the database at its own expense, and offers free testing 
to some families of consumers with unknown variations to try to determine 
the significance of the variants.109 As Myriad acquires additional 
information, it will have fewer variants of unknown significance.110 In 
contrast, competitors using public databases would not have access to 
Myriad’s proprietary information in interpreting patients’ test results.111  
Thus, Myriad’s patents arguably have provided it a competitive 
advantage in generating a database of mutations and other clinical 
information that will be difficult and costly for competitors to replicate.112 
Even if all competitors cooperated, contributing their data to a public or 
quasi-public database would not appear to be a viable alternative.113 In other 
words, so-called “private ordering” solutions to the costs of data-generating 
patents may not always be feasible.114 Such barriers, coupled with the 
inability for the market to self-correct and lack of regulatory intervention, 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 See id. at 586 (noting that to help its patients, Myriad uses “its database to reduce the frequency 
with which it reports a VUS”); id. (“[O]utsiders do not have access to Myriad’s database.”); Jacob S. 
Sherkow & Christopher Scott, Myriad Stands Alone, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 620 (2014) 
(describing Myriad’s proprietary database). 
109 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 586. 
110 See id.  
111 See id.
112 See id. (stating that recreating the database would be “redundant and thus expensive”).
113 See Conley et al., supra note 37, at 597, 614–15 (“Myriad has used its patent-based monopoly 
as the sole BRCA 1 and 2 test provider to develop, at its own cost, an extensive database that relates 
VUSs to phenotypes, details the frequency of VUSs in various populations, and includes genetic studies 
on patient families. There is no comparable public database.”); cf. Angela M. Oliver, Personalized 
Medicine in the Information Age: Myriad’s De Facto Monopoly on Breast Cancer Research, 68 SMU 
L. REV. 537, 551–52 (2015) (“If researchers could create a comparable database through such efforts, it
would strip Myriad of trade secret protection for its database.”). 
114 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in Current Context, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 897, 918–19 (2015) (“Private ordering . . . refers to ‘circumstances where parties, given 
extant legal and regulatory regimes, order the substance of their affairs and transactions as they see fit 
and resort to the judicial system for enforcement.’” (quoting F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, 
Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 111, 114 n.15 (2007))). 
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afford Myriad the ability to extend its market power well beyond the 
expiration or invalidation of its patents.115 
2. Internet Search as a Personalized, Proprietary 
Process.—Another technological field in which data-generating 
patents are valuable is internet search, in which Google is currently the 
market leader.116 Like Myriad’s patents, the power to exclude competitors 
helped enable Google to amass a huge set of proprietary data about its 
users, which is in turn protected by trade secret law.117 Google has 
leveraged this data not only to improve its underlying search technology 
but also to excel in secondary markets, critically including targeted 
advertising, from which it earns the bulk of its revenue.118  
Commentators have claimed, however, that Google’s patents are 
essentially irrelevant to its market dominance. For instance, Dan Burk 
contends that “even if the search algorithm . . . is patented, data aggregates 
around search engine operation by virtue of the search function, . . . not as a 
result of legal exclusivity.”119 There are two major reasons to dispute such 
claims. First, one must distinguish between the mechanism for aggregating 
data—e.g., a “search function” or “diagnostic screen”—and the economic 
power a data-generating patent holder may enjoy to draw more users to its 
data-aggregating mechanism and, hence, generate large amounts of data. In 
this regard, although there are many reasons a firm may enjoy market 
power, as long as patents play a substantial role in such power, they present 
a concern worth discussing. 
115 See Burk, supra note 37, at 253–54 (stating that if competitors are unable “to enter the market at 
the end of the patent period, monopoly pricing might be maintained during the patent period and 
beyond”). 
116 George Slefo, Microsoft and Yahoo Search Share Grows but Still Trails Google by Miles, 
ADVERTISINGAGE (Dec. 23, 2015), http://adage.com/article/digital/microsoft-yahoo-search-market-
share-grows-google-s-dips/301934/ [https://perma.cc/S7B7-2HU6] (explaining that Google remains 
dominant in the market for search engines, holding 64% of the market share, while the next largest 
search engine, Bing, holds 21%); Parker Thomas, Google’s Search Engine Market Share Fell to 64%, 
YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 29, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/google-search-engine-market-share-
170640710.html [https://perma.cc/YZG2-6BXB]. 
117 See Section II.A.2; Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, 
What’s the Question?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 151, 237 (“While PageRank’s original algorithm is 
patent protected, trade secret law protects all subsequent adjustments Google makes to the algorithm.”).  
118 See Manne & Wright, supra note 117, at 237. 
119 Burk, supra note 37, at 245 n.63; see also Mike Masnick, Google Doesn’t Rely on Intellectual 
Property for Its Leadership Position, TECHDIRT (Nov. 12, 2009, 10:11 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091110/0843176877.shtml [https://perma.cc/7RSD-LJN5]. 
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Second, even though Myriad and Google may primarily rely upon 
“network effects”120—namely, the benefits of having many users—to draw 
in users today, at some early point in time, a data-generating invention has 
no users. In these early stages, a data-generating patent may play a 
fundamental role in allowing its holder to exclude competitors from 
practicing the underlying invention, thereby accelerating the aggregation of 
users and associated data, leading to downstream network effects. 
Indeed, although Google may not view its patents as particularly 
valuable today, this was not the case early on in its development. Google’s 
co-founder, Larry Page, was originally a graduate student at Stanford 
University when he invented the PageRank search technology.121 In view of 
his student status, Page ceded all patent rights in PageRank to Stanford 
prior to cofounding Google.122 Page nonetheless filed for a patent, with 
Stanford as the assignee, which—along with software copyrights—Google 
promptly licensed, even before it had a domain name or a business plan.123 
120 Network effects increase the value of a good or service to a user depending on the number of 
users engaging in similar acts. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424–26 (1985); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994). 
121 JOHN MACCORMICK, NINE ALGORITHMS THAT CHANGED THE FUTURE: THE INGENIOUS IDEAS
THAT DRIVE TODAY’S COMPUTERS 24–25 (2012). Some accounts mention Google’s other co-founder, 
Sergey Brin, as an originator of the PageRank method. See Letter from Mark Fuchs, Chief Accountant, 
Google, Inc., to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 11, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1288776/000119312506170952/filename1.htm [https://perma.cc/Q8FA-DAWU] (“Larry and Sergey 
helped create the PageRank patent.”); see also Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-
Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 107 (1998). However, 
Page is the only inventor listed on the original PageRank patent. U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 
1998) (issued Sept. 4, 2001). 
122 CORONA BREZINA, SERGEY BRIN, LARRY PAGE, ERIC SCHMIDT, AND GOOGLE 30 (2012). 
123 See U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (disclosing the method for Google’s “PageRank” search 
technology); David Pridham & Brad Sheafe, Using IP to Benefit Startups and Large Companies Alike, 
CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202735624108/Using-IP-to-
Benefit-Startups-and-Large-Companies-Alike-?slreturn=20151012124727 [https://perma.cc/TNQ5-
4AMA] (“Google’s original page rank [sic] patent [was] filed before the search giant even had a 
business plan or a domain name, and [was] so valuable to Google it paid Stanford $336 million in 
shares for an exclusive license to it.”); Florian Mueller, The 4 Big Problems with Google’s Anti-Patent 
Stance, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (July 16, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-4-big-problems-
with-googles-anti-patent-stance-2011-7 [https://perma.cc/Q8K7-LXV3] (“[Google] had a software 
patent before they had a business plan, and there’s at least a strong possibility that the patent played a 
key role in Google’s ability to attract funding.”); David Pridham, “Troll” Reform Would Kill Startups, 
PROVIDENCE J. (May 27, 2015, 2:01 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/
20150527/OPINION/150529433 [https://perma.cc/93B3-HF2S] (“When Google was a startup, after all, 
it filed its seminal PageRank patent before the firm even had a business plan, venture funding, or a 
domain name — and then paid Stanford University $336 million in shares for an exclusive license to 
it.”); David Pridham, How to Kill the Next Generation of Startups, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 19, 
2015, 4:36 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_28146187/david-pridham-how-kill-next-
generation-startups [https://perma.cc/TE4S-AAQL]. 
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The original Stanford–Google license included an undisclosed up-front 
payment, yearly royalties, and a portion of the company’s equity.124 In 
2003, Google renewed its by-then exclusive license for its original patent, 
along with two other undisclosed patents, for additional yearly royalties 
through 2011 totaling over $1 million.125 Ultimately, Stanford sold its 
equity received from the deal for over $300 million, placing it in the top 
three licensing deals in the University’s history—between the process of 
creating functional antibodies ($486 million) and the process of creating 
recombinant DNA ($255 million).126 
If Google and its lawyers believed that its patents were of no value, 
then the company would not have paid sizable royalties, which constituted 
a large portion of its equity, to license the original patent.127 Although this 
is especially so initially, when Google was arguably economizing on 
expenses, this was even the case in 2003, when Google was already 
dominant in the search space, yet renewed its exclusive license.128  
124 The original license was executed on a nonexclusive basis in 1998, but with an option to make 
the license exclusive, which Google exercised in 2001. See Google, Inc., Exclusive License (Exhibit 
10.10.1 to S-1/A Filing) (Aug. 18, 2004), available in Lexis-Nexis EDGAR database (disclosing terms 
of Google’s exercise of exclusivity option under original 1998 license); Google, Inc., Amended & 
Restated License Agreement (Exhibit 10.10.3 to S-1/A Filing) (Oct. 13, 2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504105564/dex1010.htm [https://perma. 
cc/4HD2-UZJL] (providing a redacted version of the 2003 license agreement between Stanford and 
Google). 
125 See Amended & Restated License Agreement, supra note 124. After 2011, further royalties 
were to be paid until the end of the patent term, with an apparent reduction in yearly royalties from the 
end of the patent term to the end of the copyright term of Google’s original software. See id. The 
royalty amounts for 2003 to 2005 were $100,000 annually and from 2006 to 2010, $150,000 annually. 
Google, Inc. Letter, supra note 121, at ¶ 35. The exact amounts for the royalties from 1999 to 2002 and 
after 2011 do not appear to be available. See id.; Exclusive License, supra note 124; Amended & 
Restated License Agreement, supra note 124 (redacting annual royalty payments). 
126 See Greta Lorge, Closing in on Cancer, STAN. MAG., Jan./Feb. 2016, 
https://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=83001 [https://perma.cc/JU4ZRWKR] 
(relying on FY2013 data from the Association of University Technology Managers Statistics Analysis 
for Tech Transfer database and the Stanford Office of Technology Licensing). 
127 See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 351 (2012) (“[T]he 
PageRank patent, which covered a search algorithm, arguably facilitated the transfer of technology from 
Stanford University to Google.”). Moreover, although Stanford held the copyright to the original 
software, presumably the software could have been easily recreated from scratch by third-party 
developers in a “clean room” environment using the disclosure in Google’s patent. See Pamela 
Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2308, 2318 n.24 (1994) (describing how a “clean room” approach can avoid copyright 
infringement). 
128 Given the large number of additions and changes to Google’s search techniques, presumably the 
exclusive license to the copyright in Google’s original code from 1999 was not of much value by 2003. 
See AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D. MEYER, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: THE SCIENCE OF 
SEARCH ENGINE RANKINGS (2011).  
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In particular, Google’s payments for the Stanford patent provide 
strong circumstantial evidence that exclusivity—and, hence, the ability to 
prevent others (like Yahoo) from using its PageRank technology—was 
important to Google through at least 2003.129 Indeed, instead of attempting 
to replicate Google’s PageRank technology and infringe the Stanford 
patent, Yahoo licensed it and related search technology in the early 
2000s.130 At the same time, Google did not provide Yahoo with access to its 
PageRank algorithms or any of its proprietary data—rather, Yahoo merely 
overlaid its design elements over Google’s underlying search results.131 As 
such, this license did not destroy Google’s effective exclusivity and control 
over the data generated by its search technology. In this regard, the Yahoo 
license may have ultimately had more value to Google than to Yahoo by 
providing Google with even more data that it could aggregate and use to 
improve its underlying product, as well as to expand into secondary 
markets.132 Additionally, it appears from the available evidence that 
Google’s patents at least in part caused some of the then-leading search 
engines, like AltaVista and HotBot, to avoid implementing PageRank-like 
129 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of 
the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1317 (2009) (describing the process 
of startups licensing patents). 
130 Jim Hu, Yahoo Dumps Google Search Technology, CNET (Feb. 18, 2004, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/yahoo-dumps-google-search-technology/ [https://perma.cc/KW5F-7PQ3]; 
Jim Hu, Yahoo Sheds Inktomi for New Search Technology, CNET (Jan. 2, 2002, 4:43 PM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/yahoo-sheds-inktomi-for-new-search-technology/ [https://perma.cc/P2KS-
55R6]; Press Release, Google News, Yahoo! Selects Google as its Default Search Engine Provider 
(June 26, 2000), http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/06/yahoo-selects-google-as-its-default.html 
[https://perma.cc/49Y6-7KVF]. Previously, before Google launched its website, Yahoo, Excite, and 
Altavista had initially rejected Brin and Page’s offer to license the patents for $1 million; Page 
attributed this to “a lack of insight at the leadership level.” WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS: HOW 
A GROUP OF HACKERS, GENIUSES, AND GEEKS CREATED THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 462 (2014). 
131 See Hu, Yahoo Dumps Google Search Technology, supra note 130 (“This arrangement, first 
viewed as a placeholder for Yahoo, eventually gave Google more exposure to Web surfers around the 
world, helping it become a brand synonymous with search.”). 
132 In 2004, Yahoo broke with Google and decided to launch its own search engine, which of 
course never was able to compete effectively with Google’s. See Hu, Yahoo Dumps Google Search 
Technology, supra note 130. Indeed, in 2008, Yahoo’s attempts to rely on Google’s search ads were 
blocked by the Department of Justice. See Vindu Goel, In Tests, Yahoo Uses Google to Power Search 
Results and Ads, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015, 9:13 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/in-
tests-yahoo-uses-google-to-power-search-results-and-ads/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UQB4-WBPW]. 
There is some indication that Yahoo recently returned to relying on Google’s search results and search 
ads. See id. Even more recently, Yahoo sold its search engine business to Verizon, which plans to 
merge it into AOL—pending government approval—likely spelling further changes to Yahoo’s search 
engine technology. See Kara Swisher, As Expected, Verizon Says It Will Buy Yahoo for $4.83 Billion, 
RECODE (July 25, 2016, 7:13 AM), http://www.recode.net/2016/7/25/12269882/as-expected-verizon-
says-it-will-buy-yahoo-for-4-83-billion [https://perma.cc/VM6J-72VA]. 
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technology, ultimately leading to their demise.133 As one of the leading 
patent law scholars, John F. Duffy, has remarked, “the patent on Google’s 
PageRank technology . . . is surely one of the most famous and valuable of 
all modern software patents.”134 
Moreover, foundational patents often serve as signaling mechanisms, 
making startups, such as Google at that time, more attractive to investors 
and ensuring their viability to compete in somewhat crowded markets.135 
Google’s patented technology represented a major advance in providing 
quality search results, paving the way for its dominance in the search 
industry.136 To be certain, Google’s patents do not wholly foreclose 
competition in the relevant market sector (i.e., internet search), and neither 
Google nor Stanford have publicly enforced the PageRank patents.137 
Additionally, much of Google’s market dominance is afforded by 
network effects and trade secrecy.138 Nonetheless, Google’s original 
PageRank patent is fairly broad in scope, arguably foreclosing competitors 
from implementing similar “web linking” search algorithms.139 In this 
133 See Daniel Eran Dilger, Google’s Current Stance on Patents with Android Would Have 
Prevented Google from Ever Having Existed, APPLEINSIDER (May 25, 2014, 8:39 PM), 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/05/25/googles-current-stance-on-patents-with-android-would-have-
prevented-google-from-ever-having-existed [https://perma.cc/9P7X-ECSS] (“If it weren’t for . . . 
Google’s exclusive rights to practice the PageRank invention, the work that Page and Brin had 
orchestrated and found private investment for would have been appropriated and copied by larger, 
better-funded existing search firms . . . .”); Mueller, supra note 123 (“The broad PageRank patent may 
also have helped deter competitors from matching Google’s quality especially in its critical early 
years.”); LANGVILLE & MEYER, supra note 128, at 18 (noting the benefits of the PageRank technology 
over competing approaches). 
134 John F. Duffy, The Death of Google’s Patents?, PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 2, 3–7 (July 21, 2008), 
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2008/07/googlepatents101.pdf [https://perma.cc/485Q-8VKU]. 
135 See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 123 (discussing how the signaling function may 
provide the primary value of a foundational patent, particularly for software startups.). 
136 See Manish Agarwal & David K. Round, The Emergence of Global Search Engines: Trends in 
History and Competition, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 115, 126–27 (2011) (“Google’s rise as a leading 
search provider demonstrates how a search engine can outperform its competitors based on superior 
innovation. Its search algorithm . . . brought a significant increase in the quality of search results.”); 
Kristine Laudadio Devine, Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How Do You 
Solve a Problem Like Google?, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 59, 75 (2008); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 
73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (2008). 
137 On the other hand, it is very likely Google has relied upon its search patents for negotiating 
leverage in cross-licensing deals and it is possible that it has privately threatened suit. See Sichelman & 
Graham, supra note 29, at 112–13 (explaining how patents can be used to generate bargaining 
leverage).  
138 See Newman, supra note 13, at 421–22 (discussing the benefits flowing from Google’s network 
effects); Manne & Wright, supra note 117, at 237 (discussing the advantages of Google’s trade secrets). 
139 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (issued Sept. 4, 2001) (disclosing broad 
claims covering, for example, a “computer implemented method of scoring a plurality of linked 
documents”); Duffy, supra note 134, at 1–2 (“Google’s PageRank technology . . . is surely one of the 
most famous and valuable of all modern software patents.”). 
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regard, Google’s current use of its patents for so-called defensive purposes 
is not an act without market effect; indeed, cross-licensing agreements 
among incumbents in a market can afford them market power that may 
exclude entrants from the market.140 
Given the apparent strength of this patent and Google’s keen interest 
to license it from Stanford originally and again in 2003, having exercised 
the option to make the license exclusive, it seems reasonable to assume that 
other search companies chose—at least early on—not to implement 
Google’s valuable technology out of fear of a lawsuit.141 Like Myriad, 
which also relied heavily on trade secrecy and network effects to gain 
market power,142 it is likely that Google has been able to leverage its 
patented search technology to obtain a nontrivial competitive advantage in 
gathering data.143 Google captures searches, location and network data, and 
other information about its users.144 And much like Myriad’s use of patient 
information, Google’s use of this proprietary information long after its 
patents expire or are invalidated affords it the ability not only to improve its 
responses to search queries, but also to offer superior targeted advertising 
of its users to business partners.145  
3. Data-Generating Patents Across Technological Fields.—Data-
generating patents appear in numerous other applications and fields. In the 
information technology area, Google and Facebook have obtained patent 
protection over methods of facial recognition.146 These companies can link 
vast data about their users, such as search queries, locations, employment, 
140 See Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 
611, 617–19 (1984) (describing various anticompetitive effects of patent pools); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 30 (1995) (noting that cross-licensing agreements may “substantially reduce . . . incentives 
to engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets”). 
141 See supra notes 128–40. 
142 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
143 See supra Section II.A.1. 
144 Privacy Policy, supra note 5 (explaining that Google collects information both volunteered by 
users and received from their variety of services); see also Dominic Rushe, Google: Don’t Expect 
Privacy When Sending to Gmail, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2013, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/14/google-gmail-users-privacy-email-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/YN7K-QNXS] (stating that Google uses information obtained through its users’ email 
to target advertising). 
145 Terms of Service, supra note 13 (describing Google’s use of information for targeted 
advertising); see Grimmelmann, supra note 13, at 942–43 (describing how Google stores and uses 
search information to engage in targeted advertising); Nathan Newman, supra note 13 (explaining that 
Google is able to “extract ever more precise information about users to allow advertisers to more 
effectively target particular ads to those users”). 
146 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 8,213,689 (issued July 3, 2012); 8,437,500 (issued May 7, 2013); 
8,442,265 (issued May 14, 2014). 
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and social networking data with their images identified through facial 
recognition technology.147 They can retain and analyze this information as a 
trade secret long after their patents expire or are invalidated, providing vast 
amounts of data for targeted advertising and new technologies.148 For 
instance, one potential application is placing cameras in stores to identify 
shoppers, and then providing personal information to salespersons about 
the shoppers’ preferences.149  
As the ability to aggregate and analyze data from the use of patented 
technology increases, various patent holders will have the capacity to 
maintain their user data as trade secrets. Advances in DNA analysis and 
genome editing will allow for collection of a wide variety of information 
about patients.150 In the area of smart medical devices, such as heart 
monitors and fitness trackers, patent holders can gather data about 
locations, times, and biometric data.151 Such devices can collect and store 
information about a user’s actions at a given time, such as sleep habits, 
blood pressure, dietary intake, activity, stress levels, and productivity.152 
For example, a patent covering a smart contact lens allows for measuring 
glucose levels in tear fluid to help in diabetes management, as well as 
capturing the concentration of other substances in tear fluid.153 Patent 
147 At this point, Google has stated that it will not allow facial recognition apps for Google Glass. 
See Natasha Singer, Never Forgetting a Face, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/technology/never-forgetting-a-face.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
P2RJ-YXAX]. The major concern with “faceprinting,” or facial recognition software, is that it is being 
used to identify someone by name, and then the software connects the name with personal details, such 
as “their home addresses, dating preferences, employment,” search histories, and location. Id. The 
software does all this “without [the person’s] awareness or permission.” Id. 
148 See id. 
149 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern Everyday 
Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 81 (2012) (discussing the example of “a PerC-enabled mall, in which 
RFID chips embedded throughout the mall communicate to the shopper”); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, 
Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 101, 124 (2005). 
150 See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Bitter Fight over CRISPR Patent Heats Up, NATURE (Jan. 12, 2016), 
http://www.nature.com/news/bitter-fight-over-crispr-patent-heats-up-1.17961 [https://perma.cc/F3L9-
2L7L] (describing the CRISPR patent dispute); Kelly Severick, Amid Patent Lawsuit, Genetic 
Sequencing Upstart Unveils New Technology, SCIENCE (Mar. 8, 2016, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/amid-patent-lawsuit-genetic-sequencing-upstart-unveils-
new-technology [https://perma.cc/TL6B-TAFT] (describing nanopore sequencing technology). 
151 See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 88 (2014) (describing new medical 
and fitness tracking devices that “measure, record, and analyze different aspects of daily life,” including 
fitness bands that will “track the steps you take in a day, calories burned, and minutes asleep;” bands 
that will track heart rate, blood pressure, and glucose levels; bands that track sports performance; and 
bands that track mental state). 
152 See id. 
153 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,985,763 (filed Sept. 26, 2012) (issued Mar. 24, 2015) (covering a 
contact lens containing a chip); Andrew Morse, Novartis and Google to Work on Smart Contact Lenses, 
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holders and licensees of cellular phones and related mobile software can 
retain similar data154—likewise, security systems and televisions are now 
regularly tracking and storing user data.155 Gaming machines are another 
area in which user activity, betting patterns, and other information can be 
tracked and maintained as a trade secret.156 Even patent holders with 
protection relating to voting machines may be using the patented 
technology to obtain data in ways that can be protected under trade secret 
law.157 Last, there is a wide class of traditional research tools—including 
microscopes, telescopes, spectrometers, photometers, and hundreds of other 
measuring instruments—that collect (and now store) data and are often 
patented.158  
While the collection of information by corporate and other entities 
from their patented products and services is not new, advances in the means 
of aggregating and processing in the era of big data have dramatically 
altered the ability to use information.159 For instance, utilities are investing 
WALL ST. J., (July 15, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/novatis-google-to-work-on-
smart-contact-lenses-1405417127 [https://perma.cc/4VBD-LRTG]. 
154 See Steven I. Friedland, Cell Phone Searches in a Digital World: Incorporating Function as 
well as Form in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 217, 225 (2014) (stating that cell 
phones and their providers have the ability to create and store huge amounts of data, including “the 
location of cell phones” through cell phone towers); Peppet, supra note 151, at 115–16 (stating that 
smartphones can also track the owner’s health, demographics, sleep patterns, stress levels, and fitness 
through the vast amounts of applications available to download). 
155 See, e.g., ADT Security - Privacy Policy, ADT, http://www.adt.com/about-adt/legal/privacy-
policy [https://perma.cc/5C94-ARGQ] (last modified Aug. 18, 2015) (describing information 
collected); Privacy Policy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/privacy-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/TSG9-RVQ6] (last modified May 31, 2016) (describing information collection 
associated with Apple TV and other services); Claire Cain Miller, Tech Companies, Bristling, Concede 
to Federal Surveillance Program, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/08/technology/tech-companies-bristling-concede-to-government-surveillance-efforts.html?_r 
=0 [https://perma.cc/6SBD-4FJH] (describing how companies “were legally required to share the data 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act”); Michael Lewis, Boom Box, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 
13, 2000, at 36 (discussing how TiVo collects personal data by means similar to the internet); A. 
Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and 
Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 480–81 (1996) (describing the concerns with tracking 
“citizens’ movements” with security cameras and other technology). 
156 See, e.g., Bally Techs., Inc. v. Bus. Intelligence Sys. Sols., No. 2:10-CV-00440-PMP-GWF, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75887, at *3 (D. Nev. July 11, 2011) (“[C]asinos gather substantial amounts of 
data from their gaming devices, such as how much a particular machine is played, at what 
denomination, during what time of day or what day of the week.”). 
157 See, e.g., Matthew Fisher, Will Your Vote Count?: Can the Current Software Withstand and 
Guarantee the Constitutional Right to Vote?, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 91, 96 (2008).  
158 See generally Scientific Instruments, PHRONTISTERY, http://phrontistery.info/instrum.html 
[https://perma.cc/VGR8-97B3] (listing hundreds of scientific measuring instruments). 
159 See supra note 89; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 
1939 (2013) (discussing processing and analyzing big data); Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of 
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in smart grids and meters that allow for the collection and analysis of vast 
amounts of data.160 In addition to the standard usage of data analysis to 
ensure reliability in services and to minimize the length of outages, smart 
meter data mining can be useful in far-reaching areas, such as setting prices 
and marketing related products.161  
These are but a few examples of how data mining and analysis in the 
era of big data, when coupled with the market exclusivity afforded by 
patents, can produce unique legal and economic consequences. As we 
explain further below, although data-generating patents certainly do not 
comprise the bulk of existing patents today, they are numerous and rapidly 
growing, and their implications for competition, public health, and privacy 
have a greater substantive effect than their volume reflects. 
B. Legal Consequences and Concerns of Patenting
Data-Generating Inventions 
The traditional safeguards of patent and trade secret law sometimes do 
not apply to data-generating inventions. Limitations in the disclosure 
requirements of patent law allow for much of the information obtained 
from data-generating patents to remain secret long after the leveraged 
patents expire or are invalidated.162 Further, the inability of would-be 
competitors to reverse engineer or engage in independent discovery while 
the underlying patent is in effect might also upset the balance between 
patent and trade secret law. Indeed, we suggest that the recent exclusion of 
some data-generating inventions from patent eligibility may stem from 
concerns about the broad effects of these inventions not only on 
downstream technologies but also on downstream data.163 
1. Data-Generating Patents and Trade Secrets as 
Complements.—Data-generating patents present a unique use of 
Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331 (2013) 
(describing advances in big data techniques).  
160 See Utilities and Big Data: Accelerating the Drive to Value, ORACLE 17 (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.oracle.com/us/dm/oracle-utilities-2013-1979214.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UUR-BE82] (“The 
average utility with more than one million customers will invest approximately $180 million in the 
smart grid and smart metering over the next five years.”). 
161 Id. 
162 See supra note 33. There are structural similarities between our analysis and how companies 
can leverage their patents to enjoy greater trademark protection, and the responses of courts to limit 
such leverage. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 1462–63 (describing how trademark 
and patent law may serve as economic complements so as to effectively extend patent term); see also 
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). 
163 See infra Section III.B.1. 
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patents and trade secrets as economic complements.164 Information can be 
withheld from a patent in two ways: (1) protecting innovative information 
as a secret prior to patenting and (2) withholding or maintaining secret 
information from a patent application or patent in view of fairly weak 
disclosure requirements. Data-generating patents operate along the second 
dimension, particularly after the issuance of a patent.165 
In this regard, once a patent is filed, there is no duty to update its 
disclosure with newly found information relevant to the patent; indeed, 
there is an affirmative proscription against doing so.166 As such, inventors 
may choose to retain post-filing information about the invention as a trade 
secret. Typically, such information may include ideal operating parameters, 
improvements, and general market information about the invention. In this 
regard, commercial embodiments of inventions developed well after 
patenting often substantially differ from what is disclosed in a patent.167 
Yet, because the scope of the legal rights afforded by patents is generally 
much broader than what is disclosed in the patent disclosure, these 
commercial embodiments—and the information related to them—typically 
are protected by the original patent or by trade secret law.168  
For instance, an inventor may, after filing for a patent, determine the 
ideal material for a collapsible garden hose, whose novelty mainly depends 
on its unique shape.169 Because the inventor did not know of the material at 
the time of filing, there was no need to disclose it then (or at any future 
time), and if it is difficult to reverse engineer, the inventor may effectively 
retain it as a trade secret.170 Because the patent provides the inventor the 
ability to exclude others from manufacturing any hose of the same or 
similar shape, there will be little incentive (absent a license from the patent 
holder) for others to perform research to determine the ideal material for 
the hose during the term of the patent.171 Indeed, making such a hose, even 
if purely for research purposes, would constitute infringement.172 Once the 
164 See supra Section I.B. 
165 See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
166 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2012) (barring the addition of “new matter” to a patent application so as to 
ensure all material in the application originates from the priority date or earlier). 
167 See supra note 73. 
168 See supra notes 76–80. 
169 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 13/690,670 (filed Nov. 30, 2012) (disclosing an 
“expandable garden hose”). 
170 See supra notes 76–80. 
171 § 271; Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800 (2002) (“Patent infringement is often characterized as a strict 
liability tort . . . .”). 
172 § 271; infra note 345. 
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term expires (or perhaps right near the end if detection is unlikely), a third 
party may begin to experiment with different materials to create a “generic” 
copy of the hose.173 The ability of the original patentee to maintain the 
material as a trade secret, however, will allow it to effectively extend its 
patent rights past the twenty-year term afforded by the patent, delaying 
third-party attempts to determine the ideal material after expiration.174 In 
other words, if potential competitors cannot determine the material, or a 
close substitute, the patentee will continue to be able to charge above-
market prices for its now unpatented hose.175  
To the extent inventions are supposed to fall into the public domain 
once the patent term expires, this use of patents and trade secrets as 
complements arguably thwarts the goals of the patent system.176 Even in 
fields in which some disclosure of post-patenting data is required for 
regulatory purposes, such as medical devices or pharmaceuticals, this 
strategy can still be effective because such disclosed data is typically 
maintained as a secret by the applicable regulatory agency.177 Indeed, even 
third-party testing of medical-related inventions to determine efficacy and 
safety will generally constitute actionable infringement.178 
These limitations of the current patent disclosure rules have been well 
studied.179 Data-generating patents, however, present unique concerns that 
have not been sufficiently addressed. Unlike the garden hose invention, a 
data-generating patent will often yield information subject to trade secret 
law not merely about the invention itself, but also about the invention’s 
users and that can be advantageous in separate product markets.180 As 
noted, Google’s patented search algorithms can be used not only to 
173 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 24 n.86 (2001) (“One classic justification for having a patent system is to 
encourage inventors to disclose their ideas to the public, who will benefit from this new knowledge 
once the patent expires.”); Simon, supra note 99, at 1342 (2011) (“Most research use is ignored until it 
is disseminated or results in an improvement or alternative means.”). 
174 Cohen & Lemley, supra note 173. 
175 Id. 
176 See supra note 45. 
177 See infra note 358 and accompanying text; see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, 
Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2016) 
(discussing trade secret protection for manufacturing processes of patented biologics); Price II, supra 
note 58, at 32 (describing how innovators receive both patent protection on biologics and “are sheltered 
from competition indefinitely by the secrecy surrounding their manufacturing methods”). 
178 Simon, supra note 99, at 1324–25; cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012) (providing for an exception to 
infringement for experimentation related to the submission of information to the FDA). 
179 See Sichelman, supra note 76, at 355–56; Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 539, 572–73 (2009). 
180 See supra Section II.A. 
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improve those algorithms but also to better target advertising to its users.181 
Such leveraging into secondary markets in the era of big data presents a use 
of patents and trade secrets as economic complements that was essentially 
unheard of in the twentieth century and arguably well outside the “bargain” 
for exclusive rights contemplated by the patent system.  
2. Traditional Trade Secret Safeguards Generally Do Not Apply to
Data-Generating Patents.—Ordinarily, trade secrets are subject to
reasonable limitations to prevent against overreaching.182 Two oft-cited 
defenses in ensuring that trade secret law does not overreach are the ability 
to reverse engineer a product or process embodying a trade secret, or 
simply independently discovering the trade secret.183 In contrast, neither 
reverse engineering nor independent discovery typically provide defenses 
to patent infringement.184 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp. focused on independent creation and reverse engineering as 
the key distinguishing features in determining that trade secret was not 
preempted by patent law.185 If either occurs, trade secret protection will be 
lost.186   
With data-generating patents, the ability to reverse engineer the 
resulting trade secret is often foreclosed, or at least severely restricted, 
during the term of the data-generating patent. Traditionally, competitors 
and others can obtain information about trade secrets by observation or 
through analysis of products or other materials that are publicly 
accessible.187 Reverse engineering has a major benefit: it “will often 
generate knowledge about the product being reverse engineered that will 
make it possible to improve on it.”188 As David Friedman, William Landes, 
and Richard Posner have suggested, without the ability to effectively 
reverse engineer, trade secrets would become “superpatents” that would 
have “obvious problems of conflict with patent law.”189 The major 
difference with patenting is twofold: (1) patents have a limited duration 
181 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
182 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974).  
183 Id. at 476; see also Anderson, supra note 41, at 950. 
184 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 489–90.  
185 Id. at 490 (“[T]rade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and 
honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering . . . .”). 
186 See id.; Jon Chally, Note, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1285 (2004). 
187 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 
476 (defining reverse engineering).  
188 See Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 70. 
189 Id. at 70–71 (“The fact that reverse engineering is costly, moreover, automatically cuts down on 
the amount of free-riding on the first inventor.”). 
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while trade secrets do not and (2) patents by definition disclose valuable 
information about the innovation.190 Trade secret protection is designed to 
expire at the point the secret can be reversed engineered or independently 
invented—such a balance makes economic sense because society loses 
little by enforcing a trade secret that others could not have generated on 
their own.191 
 In the case of data-generating patents, however, the ability to reverse 
engineer trade secrets is often illusory.192 When a data-generating invention 
is patented, would-be competitors are effectively foreclosed from reverse 
engineering for a substantial period, as they are prohibited from making 
and using the patented invention during the twenty-year exclusivity 
period.193 Whether the underlying data-generating invention is a patented 
search engine or medical diagnostic test, the ability to reverse engineer or 
independently generate otherwise secret information obtained through 
patent exclusivity often is infeasible.194 In particular, a search engine or 
190 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 33, at 383, 394; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
191 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 16 (1998) 
(explaining that without reverse engineering, trade secret protection would essentially last forever and 
inventors would select trade secret over patent). 
192 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 490 (1974) (“While trade secret law does not forbid the 
discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse 
engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of the invention for whatever 
purpose for a significant length of time.”). 
193 See id.; see also Fauver, supra note 9, at 676 (explaining that original patent holders would have 
established head start in the market, which puts the patent holder at an “advantage over competitors 
having to start ‘from scratch’ to develop the product”).  
194 Moreover, in the case of medical diagnostic tests, even if the patent covering the data-
generating invention at issue has expired, laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) often limit 
the distribution of the collected information. H.I.P.A.A. Privacy Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 
2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/privrulepd.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTL8-
489D]; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). 
 However, companies that develop hardware or software programs that aggregate and analyze 
medical data are not expressly subject to HIPAA. See id; see also Jeff Rabkin & Jessica Jardine Wilkes, 
Wearable Technology, Big Data and the Legal Frontier, LAW.COM (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.law.com/sites/lawcomcontrib/2015/12/14/wearable-technology-big-data-and-the-legal-
frontier/ [https://perma.cc/D5KG-PRD3]. In addition, devices that collect and analyze data without 
controlling the function of a medical device are generally exempt from FDA oversight, unless their use 
could interfere with clinical treatment. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS. ET AL., MEDICAL DEVICE DATA SYSTEMS, MEDICAL IMAGE STORAGE DEVICES, AND MEDICAL 
IMAGE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES 5–8 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM401996.pdf?source=govdeli
very&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/9XWF-FXFD]. 
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diagnostic test patent may entirely preclude substitute technologies, which 
in turn precludes competitors and others from generating similar data.195 
As noted earlier, using its patent on the BRCA gene markers for breast 
cancer, Myriad has been able to amass a database of mutations unrivaled by 
competitors or public actors.196 Indeed, Myriad effectively stopped 
contributing to public databases almost a decade ago, when it decided to 
maintain its users’ data as a trade secret.197 Although Myriad has published 
articles on its findings, it has not provided its interpretive algorithms or 
data supporting its conclusions.198 Any company that wants to compete with 
Myriad can only interpret variations based on limited public data using 
incomplete analytic algorithms.199 By leveraging its patents, Myriad has 
managed to extend its exclusivity, even after its patents were invalidated by 
the Supreme Court for lack of patentable subject matter.200 What began 
with patent protection over genetic information now includes trade secret 
protection for Myriad’s databases of patients’ full genetic sequences and 
phenotypic information, as well as the correlations and algorithms resulting 
from access to that wealth of data.201 In many ways, the generated data may 
prove more valuable than the now-invalidated patents on the underlying 
technology itself.202 
Arguably, a similar analysis as to Myriad’s database applies to 
Google’s proprietary user data obtained through its patented search 
technology.203 In any technological field in which data-generating patents 
provide a substantial market advantage, third parties may be hindered from 
reverse engineering data solely protected by trade secret law. 
195 See supra Section II.A. 
196 See supra Section II.A.1; Oliver, supra note 113, at 540–41 (“Myriad, through its patent-
conferred role as the exclusive testing laboratory for BRCA gene testing, created a database full of VUS 
data . . . . Since November 25, 2004, however, Myriad has kept a tight handle on its data set, retaining 
its important data as proprietary.”). 
197 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 586 (showing that after 2005, Myriad decided to not 
disclose any of its findings from its testing and began retaining “data as a trade secret”). 
198 See id. (explaining that the public lacks access to the “analytic algorithms [and] underlying 
sequence data”). 
199 See Oliver, supra note 113, at 540–41; see also Conley et al., supra note 37, at 615 (“Myriad 
has access to public databases in interpreting mutations, but outsiders do not have access to Myriad’s 
database.”). 
200 See Conley et al., supra note 37, at 600, 616. 
201 See Oliver, supra note 113, at 548 (“The VUS data obtained from Myriad’s period as the 
exclusive provider of BRCA gene testing will likely be eligible for trade secret protection.”). 
202 Indeed, some have questioned whether there is still a role for patents in the personalized 
medicine space after recent Supreme Court decisions limiting patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., 
Burk, supra note 37, at 236–39 (explaining the effects, positive and negative, of the Supreme Court’s 
Myriad decision on personalized medicine). 
203 See supra Section II.A.2. 
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 In other areas of intellectual property, Congress has addressed 
situations in which enforcement may frustrate reverse engineering.204 By 
enacting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), for example, 
Congress bolstered protection for copyrighted works by limiting the 
circumvention of access controls.205 Congress, however, permitted limited 
exceptions for reverse engineering to allow for interoperability, encryption 
research, and security testing.206 These exceptions to the DMCA highlight 
the need to balance robust intellectual property protection against the 
traditional public safeguards ensured by allowing reverse engineering of 
trade secrets. Unlike the DMCA, there is no exception to patent 
infringement for reverse engineering trade secrets obtained through data-
generating patents.207 Thus, data-generating patents may hinder data 
sharing, further research, and testing in ways that may be socially 
detrimental. 
Although not quite as difficult as reverse engineering trade secret data 
resulting from data-generating patents, independent discovery is also 
severely limited by the nature of these patents. If the patent holder is 
dominant in the marketplace, it can preclude others—even those who 
independently invent—from practicing the patented invention in order to 
maintain its large market share. Using non-infringing techniques to 
generate the same data may in many instances be infeasible. For the 
mutations at issue in the Myriad patent, there are no other genes that can be 
used to identify the mutations.208 For Google’s PageRank patents, there are 
clearly alternatives, but they are considered inferior and thus have garnered 
many fewer users.209 When there are no equivalent alternatives to a patented 
data-generating invention, it may be effectively impossible to recreate the 
data—even fully independently—generated by the data-generating patent 
holder.210 
 Even after a data-generating patent expires or is invalidated, the 
patentee will tend to have a significant lead time that will handicap any 
204 See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197–1204 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
205 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), (g) (2012). 
206 Id. § 1201(f), (g), (j); see also id. § 906 (protecting reverse engineering under the 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984). 
207 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see also supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra note 116 and accompanying text; MIKLOS SAVARY, GURUS AND ORACLES: THE
MARKETING OF INFORMATION viii (2012) (“PageRank made Google the dominant Internet search 
engine . . . .”). 
210 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing how Myriad’s patents provided the 
exclusive ability to collect patient data for over a decade). 
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competitor from entering the field post-expiration or post-invalidation.211 
This informational deficiency for any new market participant may result in 
prohibitive switching costs for consumers, even if the competitor has better 
methods or lower pricing.212 The high costs of independently generating the 
data that the patentee obtained with the twenty-year lead time often ensures 
there will be little risk of independent discovery, and ultimately, 
competition.213  
3. Is the Subject Matter of Data-Generating Patents Outside the
Scope of Patent Protection?—Recent decisions from the Supreme
Court have, to some degree, made it more difficult to obtain data-
generating patents, particularly in the fields of medical diagnostic testing 
and software.214 Most importantly, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Court expressed a concern that patents 
over laws of nature “will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a 
danger that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more 
than an instruction to ‘apply the natural law.’”215 Based upon this rationale, 
the Court not only invalidated the medical diagnostic at issue, but cast 
doubt over the patentability of nearly all medical diagnostic tests.216 The 
211 See generally Fauver, supra note 9, at 676 (discussing lead time advantages generated by 
patents). 
212 See generally Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 
97 ECON. J. 99 (1987). 
213 Although it may appear that the switching costs for consumers from Google to another search 
engine are low because users can easily choose to use a different search engine, such an analysis is 
wanting. But see Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: 
A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 169, 195 (2013) (“[C]hanging the 
default setting to a different search engine requires only a few simple steps. For that reason, default 
search engine contracts with OEMs do not generate significant switching costs.”). Rather, the switching 
costs inhere in the opportunity and other costs generated by the additional time it would take a user to 
wade through inferior search results when using an alternative search engine that does not have access 
to the user’s (and other users’) search histories and browsing patterns. See ERIC ENGE ET AL., THE ART 
OF SEO 625 (2012) (describing how Google personalizes search results based on a user’s search 
history); infra note 232. 
214 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77, 92 (2012) 
(concluding that Prometheus Laboratories’s patent claims were invalid because they “effectively claim 
the underlying laws of nature themselves” and only “simply describe these natural relations”); Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (“[M]erely requiring generic computer 
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”); see also Aria 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 726 F. 3d 1296, 1302–04 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding the “method for 
detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid” unpatentable as a law of nature). 
215 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 86 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted 
Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011)). 
216 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 
256 (2015) (stating that the “most important advances” in diagnostics “lie outside the boundaries of 
patent-eligible subject matter”); Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of 
Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1908 (2016) (“[D]iagnostic method innovators 
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Court adopted a similar rationale in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 
where it applied the Mayo test to abstract ideas, and like Mayo, called into 
question the patentability of a large class of inventions, here software.217 
Many data-generating inventions are likely to fall into the fields of 
medical diagnostics and software.218 Indeed, data-generating inventions are 
but one example of how inventions in these areas tend to exhibit 
preemptive potential and allow for possible control over unforeseen 
markets.219 Thus, the Court’s move to limit patent protection in these fields 
indirectly responds to some of the specific concerns we raise about data-
generating inventions.  
Yet, the indirect response of limiting patentability does not eliminate 
all of the potential concerns data-generating inventions raise. As an initial 
matter, data-generating patents that predate these decisions may have 
already provided a market advantage to their holders, potentially requiring 
a response to diminish any detrimental effects.220 Even going forward, 
many classes of data-generating inventions remain patentable, including 
smart medical and sport devices, such as pacemakers and fitness trackers; 
GPS and other transportation tracking devices; mobile phones, televisions, 
and other electronic devices, which can monitor and store usage patterns; 
voting machines; and security systems.221 Also, some classes of software 
and medical diagnostic tests still remain patentable.222  
Nor is it likely that patent laws in this context somehow preempt state 
trade secret protection for the data generated by these inventions. As the 
Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., “the extension of 
trade secret protection to clearly patentable inventions does not conflict 
have begun to and will continue to find it more difficult to obtain method patent claims on their 
inventions.”). 
217 134 S. Ct. at 2353–57 (“[M]ethod claims, which merely require generic computer 
implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention . . . .”). 
218 See supra Section II.A. 
219 See infra Section III.A. 
220 See infra Part III. 
221 See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (finding that applied processes may be eligible for patent 
protection); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 
17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 269 (2015) (discussing “whether the resulting [eligibility] doctrines 
can be predictably applied by the institutions involved in patent law”). 
222 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013) (“cDNA 
is not a ‘product of nature’ and is patent eligible under § 101, except insofar as very short series of 
DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA.”); DDR Holdings, LLC v. 
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that the software patent claims at 
issue “specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result” and “recite 
an invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet”). 
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with the patent policy of disclosure.”223 Although the Court reaffirmed in 
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC that patent royalties could not extend 
past the term of the patent, it expressly found that post-term royalties 
premised on trade secret protection were fully allowable.224 So while it is 
possible to make seemingly credible arguments that data-generating patents 
improperly extend the scope of the patent, it seems very unlikely that such 
arguments would prevail.225 For similar reasons, defenses of patent misuse 
in this context are unlikely to have merit.226   
In sum, despite substantial changes in patentable subject matter, many 
types of data-generating inventions remain patentable, and the information 
generated by these inventions very likely remains protectable by state and 
federal trade secret law. In the next Section, we address the economic 
effects of these inventions in greater detail. 
C. The Economic Effects of Data-Generating Patents
The economic effects of data-generating patents may raise concerns, 
particularly with regard to innovation incentives and the effects on the 
market relationship between patent holders and consumers. Although 
providing patent protection for data-generating inventions helps to ensure 
optimal incentives exist to produce these inventions and the data generated 
by them, too much protection may ultimately hinder downstream 
innovation. Additionally, providing trade secret protection for data 
generated during the patent term may extend deadweight losses to 
consumers after the underlying patent expires or is invalidated. 
223 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974); cf. Sharon K. Sandeen, Be Careful What You Wish For: Trade 
Secrets and the America Invents Act 1 (Sept. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327263 [http://perma.cc/93R6-97SG] (examining 
“whether in light of the AIA certain parts of trade secret law ‘as applied’ are now preempted by patent 
law”). 
224 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408 (2015). 
225 Burk, supra note 37, at 252–53 (“Preemption of trade secrets of course could prove messy; one 
would not want to open the flood gates to a run of employee data pilfering or industrial espionage, 
prompted by the prospect of hiding behind federal supremacy.”). 
226 Patent misuse is a defense to infringement that occurs when the patentee engages in certain 
behavior considered to be impermissibly anticompetitive. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 
976 F.2d 700, 702–04 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The policy purpose was to prevent a patentee from using the 
patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which inheres in the statutory patent right.”). Dan Burk 
contends that misuse could be used to cabin trade secret protection as “a sort of ‘fruit of the poisonous 
tree’ exclusion for leveraging patent benefits beyond the relevant patent term.” Burk, supra note 37, at 
253. Although we agree with Burk as a conceptual matter, given the Supreme Court’s broad holdings in
Kewanee Oil and Kimble, we do not think courts are likely to rely upon the misuse doctrine in the
context of data-generating patents. We explore the issue of whether this doctrine should, as a normative
matter, be altered in Part III. 
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1. Data-Generating Patents and Innovation Incentives.—We
explained earlier how data-generating patents can yield unique market 
rewards by conferring exclusive control over not only the underlying 
invention but also the data generated by it, often for use in secondary 
product markets.227 In this discussion, we suggested that because this 
additional protection was not contemplated by the patent system, it could 
potentially overcompensate inventors for their efforts.  
Another possibility, however, is that this additional protection is 
necessary to provide optimal incentives to create data-generating 
inventions, or the data generated by them.228 On this account, data-
generating inventions are unique, because their very nature is to produce 
data.229 For instance, as we explained, Myriad’s medical diagnostic test for 
detecting the incidence of breast cancer is not particularly valuable absent a 
large database of information about genetic mutations.230 Perhaps such a 
database can only be amassed by a monopolist.231 Similarly, the more data 
Google collects about its users, the more valuable its search algorithms are 
to its users.232 To the extent the data can be used in secondary product 
markets, such as consumer-targeted advertising, that is arguably a small 
price to pay for the value delivered via the improved underlying 
invention.233 
Indeed, one can strengthen these arguments by relying upon 
alternatives to the traditional “reward” theory of patents, namely prospect 
and commercialization theory.234 Popular variants of these theories counsel 
in favor of expansive patent protection in order to prevent inefficient 
allocation of resources by concentrating investments in R&D into a single 
party.235 These benefits might extend to data-generating patents, where the 
data generated improves on the patented invention, or even provides 
227 See supra Section II.B.1. 
228 See Burk, supra note 37, at 242–47 (describing the beneficial role patents may serve in 
promoting data aggregation in the context of personalized medicine). 
229 See id. at 248 (“What is of primary interest in the context of personalized medicine is . . . the 
development of unpatented but valuable information.”). 
230 See id. at 244–45 (explaining how patents in the field of personalized medicine may allow for 
the aggregation of otherwise “widely dispersed” information). 
231 See id. at 244–47 (suggesting that either monopolization or centralization may be essential to 
aggregate sufficient data in the context of personalized medicine). 
232 Todd Hixon, Down-to-Earth Value from Big Data, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2013, 6:51 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2013/10/17/down-to-earth-value-from-big-data/#40f981ae1077 
[http://perma.cc/AXT7-35ZH]. 
233 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
234 See Burk, supra note 37, at 246–47 (examining the role of prospect theory in the area of 
personalized medicine). 
235 See Kitch, supra note 60, at 276. 
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inroads to another technology or market.236 The coordination of resources 
by a data-generating patent holder could mitigate downstream development 
costs, particularly as courts place greater restrictions on subject matter 
eligibility.237 For example, when Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents 
were in full effect, providing it with exclusive control over the data 
generated by its patents, Myriad was able to reduce the rate of variants of 
unknown significance (VUS), providing more complete test results for 
patients with these mutations.238 If the data had been generated by multiple 
competitors, each company’s VUS rate would be significantly higher, 
unless the data were shared.239 
Such an account is subject to some doubt, however. First, although 
broader protection might provide greater incentives to invest in inventions 
that generate valuable data, such an argument could be made for many 
types of inventions.240 In general, broader rights will lead to more initial 
invention.241 But broader rights have substantial downsides, including 
hindering potential downstream invention and consumer deadweight losses, 
which we discuss further below.242 Additionally, broader rights in particular 
technological fields can create allocative distortions, channeling too much 
R&D into those areas relative to others that are more deserving.243  
Second, prospect theory has been the subject of criticism, particularly 
because coordination often depends on the presence of low transaction 
costs.244 The main concern, particularly for data-generating patents, is that 
innovation and improvements may be thwarted by providing too much 
protection for this type of data.245 Although patent holders will often be in 
236 See Burk, supra note 37, at 247–49 (discussing the use of patents to coordinate the extraction of 
non-patent data). 
237 See id. 
238 See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
239 As we discuss in Section III.B.2, there are substantial incentives for competitors not to share 
data. See infra note 371 and accompanying text. 
240 See Kitch, supra note 60, at 268. 
241 See id. 
242 See infra Section II.C.2. 
243 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 
122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1913–16 (2013). 
244 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual 
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 729 (2007) (noting that the 
prospect theory of “[t]he optimality of private property as the model for intellectual property protection 
depends . . . on low transaction costs” and that “the assumption that low transaction costs are vital does 
not bear out in the history of many fields of innovation”). 
245 Lee Petherbridge, Comment, Intelligent Trips Implementation: A Strategy for Countries on the 
Cusp of Development, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1029, 1060 (2001) (“It is also a common premise 
that allowing too much protection in the form of patents is economically inefficient.”). 
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the best position to make improvements or extend technology into new 
areas, they may choose not to do so, particularly where they have invested 
in a technology that has become the standard in a field and might be 
superseded by an improvement.246 Without competition, Myriad and other 
holders of data-generating patents will often lack the incentives to fully 
develop their diagnostic tests. For example, for over a decade, Myriad 
failed to adopt comprehensive testing mechanisms to detect mutations that 
were critical to patient health.247 Myriad only made improvements to its 
tests after several studies conducted by nonclinical researchers described 
the shortcomings of Myriad’s offerings.248 
The reluctance to improve a technology and the possibility of high 
transaction costs caution against merely expanding the scope of patent 
rights to enhance coordination, at least without some contrary empirical 
evidence.249 As there is little to no evidence showing that incentives to 
produce data-generating inventions are too weak absent further legal 
protection, we believe a cautious stance towards strengthening patent 
protection in this instance is called for, especially given the potential social 
costs of these inventions.250 
2. The Extension of Deadweight Losses by Data-Generating
Patents.—Aside from innovation incentives, data-generating
patents have the potential to significantly affect the market relationship 
between patent holders and consumers. Typically, part of the quid pro quo 
246 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428–29 (1908); Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 63, at 843, 907–09; Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a 
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 423 (2002); see also Simon, supra 
note 99, at 1317.  
247 See Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application 
of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 138–39 (2002); Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated 
Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 835, 849 (“Scientific reports that identify genomic 
arrangements in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes that are not detected by the Myriad testing date back at 
least to 2001.”); Sachs, supra note 216, at 1892 n.48 (“Scientists alleged that as late as 2006, more than 
ten years after it began operating, Myriad’s test still did not detect a significant percentage of large 
genomic deletions or duplications.”); Simon, supra note 99, at 1309 (“A study by nonclinical 
researchers has shown that Myriad’s exclusive testing provided false negatives in 10–20% of high risk 
patients.”); Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in 
Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1380, 1386 (2006) (stating that multiple 
studies have identified gene mutations that were not detected by Myriad’s testing methods). 
248 Simon, supra note 99, at 1309 n.47 (“Though Myriad eventually adopted more comprehensive 
methods of testing, how long might Myriad have taken to implement these methods absent the 
dissemination of information from the study?”). 
249 See Sichelman, supra note 76, at 381–89 (explaining how in the presence of high transaction 
costs, expanding the scope of patent rights may decrease technology commercialization). 
250 See Burk, supra note 37, at 253–54; Conley et al., supra note 37, at 600; Cook-Deegan et al., 
supra note 37, at 585.  
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for granting patent exclusivity is the assurance that information about the 
invention will become part of the public domain after patent expiration.251 
By protecting information resulting from data-generating patents, however, 
it may be too costly for competitors to use the invention itself. Thus, while 
the data-generating invention technically falls into the public domain 
following expiration, the ability to retain key data generated by the 
invention may effectively preclude patent law’s quid pro quo. Of course, 
the limitations of the disclosure requirements, such as the failure to require 
applicants to update their disclosures after filing, always result in some 
information being retained by the patent holder. What makes data-
generating inventions different from other inventions is that the retained 
information does not just concern the use or operation of the invention 
itself, but rather can affect disparate markets for the information, and for a 
potentially indefinite duration.252  
Patents can impose substantial consumer losses during the patent 
term.253 In other words, if a patent provides market power to its holder, 
prices of the patented good will tend to be higher than the competitive 
price, which will foreclose some consumers from purchasing the patented 
product who otherwise would have in a competitive market.254 These 
priced-out consumers create so-called deadweight losses.255 Maintaining 
information contributed by consumers during the patent term as a trade 
secret could thus extend deadweight losses to the same class of consumers 
well past the expiration or invalidation of the patent. If, as we explained in 
the previous Section, patent term is optimally calibrated to induce 
innovation, then these additional deadweight losses are only worth the cost 
if the information protected by trade secret law provides social benefits 
greater than these costs.  
To the extent continued deadweight losses are not socially optimal, 
consumers have few means to directly combat their implicit cooperation in 
extending these costs.256 As an initial matter, although users are the main 
contributors of information in data-generating patents, they often 
undervalue their data.257 Even if consumers did place greater weight on 
251 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
252 See supra notes 187–203 and accompanying text. 
253 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000) (“All patents impose social costs.”). 
254 See id.  
255 See id. 
256 See infra notes 257–69. 
257 See, e.g., Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic 
Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 850, 860–63 (2014) (stating that users 
“clearly underestimate the economic value of [their] personal data”). 
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their contributions, they generally lack a property right in their data in the 
United States, even when they have paid to use a patented invention.258 In 
addition, because data-generating inventions are protected by patents, there 
is often only one or a few providers of an essential service or test that 
participants can rely upon.259 Thus, consumers are frequently locked in to 
the patent holder’s business strategy, including contractual requirements to 
release any rights in personal data.260 
Indeed, consumers—at least in the United States—have not been 
overly concerned about the use of their information by private companies, 
particularly when the consent process has been clear.261 In the genetic 
testing space, despite complaints about Myriad’s decision to discontinue 
data contributions to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) repository 
almost a decade ago, consumers (which we define broadly to include 
patients, genetic counselors, and physicians) still chose to use Myriad for 
genetic analysis.262 Once the Supreme Court invalidated several of 
Myriad’s patent claims, some consumers began seeking out other 
providers, such as Ambry and Veritas Genetics.263 Despite the availability 
of recent market entrants, however, many users have nonetheless chosen 
Myriad, as there are still prohibitive switching costs—particularly given 
Myriad’s decade of lead time gained largely as a result of its data-
generating patents.264 
In the area of internet search, despite repeated complaints about 
privacy policies, participation generally appears to have been unaffected.265 
258 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1166 (2008) 
(holding that if participants have donated samples with informed consent, they no longer hold an 
ownership right in them); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1074–76 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying parents a property right in bodily tissues and genetic 
information of their participant children suffering from a rare disease); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (denying the plaintiff a property 
right in the cell line derived from his spleen).   
259 See supra note 193. 
260 See supra note 193. 
261 See Newman, supra note 257, at 860–63. 
262 Complaint at 26, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-04515), 2009 WL 1343027, at *12–13. 
263 See Turna Ray, With New BRCA Testing Options, Patient Groups Advise Women to Speak to 
Genetics Expert, Share Reports, GENOMEWEB (June 19, 2013), https://www.genomeweb.com/clinical-
genomics/new-brca-testing-options-patient-groups-advise-women-speak-genetics-expert-share 
[https://perma.cc/CM9X-5RL8] (“Immediately after the court released its decision, a number of labs 
announced that they would begin testing for BRCA alterations, including GeneDx, Pathway Genomics, 
Ambry Genetics, and Gene by Gene.”). 
264 See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
265 See Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5A8V-H2NB] (stating the amount of active Facebook users have grown to 1.71 billion despite any 
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Some users may not be aware that they, or more precisely their data, are the 
product.266 Even consumers that appreciate their information is being sold 
in exchange for access to the service may undervalue that data.267 Switching 
costs are presumptively lower here than in the genetic testing area, given 
the likelihood of overlapping patents and more limited coverage, allowing 
for more competition.268 However, once users have contributed large 
amounts of information to a data-generating patent holder, such as Google 
or Facebook, they are likely to be reluctant to switch to providers who can 
only provide inferior search results or social networking.269 
In this regard, although Google and Facebook may appear to be “free” 
to consumers, if that were the case, these companies would not earn any 
profit.270 Rather, the users of Google and Facebook effectively pay these 
concerns with the privacy policy as of June 2016); Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers with Users’ Emotions 
in News Feed Experiment, Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-
experiment-stirring-outcry.html [https://perma.cc/H3NX-UV46] (explaining that in 2014, Facebook 
raised concerns when it was revealed that the social media network was manipulating their users’ news 
feed for a study); Joshua Barrie, Nobody Is Using Google+, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 20, 2015, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-active-users-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/7T8E-XEP7] (stating that 
approximately 9% of the 2.2 billion Google+ profiles are actively being used); Katy Barnato, Google’s 
Changes to Gmail Provoke More Privacy Fears, CNBC (Jan. 10, 2014, 8:42 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101326350 [https://perma.cc/U3SC-6BTF] (discussing how Google+’s privacy 
policy raised concerns in 2014 when it changed its policy so that anyone could look up any Gmail 
account without users giving their e-mail address out). 
266 See Steve Kovach, Tim Cook Ripped Apart Google’s Business Model in Two Paragraphs, BUS.
INSIDER AUSTL. (Sept. 18, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/tim-cook-privacy-
letter-2014-9 [https://perma.cc/6ACH-HBTL]. In an open letter, Apple CEO Tim Cook explained that 
internet services, like Google, are using user’s “personal data to market products to you.” Id. Therefore, 
Cook explains that users of internet services are not the customer; rather, they are the product. See id. 
267 See Newman, supra note 257, at 860–63. 
268 See Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support at 43, In re 
BRCA1– and BRCA2–Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (D. Utah 2014) 
(No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS), 2013 WL 7862854, at *23 (stating that switching costs for genetic testing are 
very high because insurance companies will usually not “reimburse for a second, repetitive test”); 
Catherine Tucker & Alexander Marthews, Social Networks, Advertising, and Antitrust, 19 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1211, 1223 (2012) (stating that the switching costs for social networks like Facebook are fairly
low). 
269 See supra note 136 and accompanying text; Shawn Baldwin, Why Facebook Shares Will Rise 
Just Like Amazon’s Did, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2012, 12:49 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/
shawnbaldwin/2012/10/04/facebook-2-0/#73b85e672f21 [https://perma.cc/448R-TJPN]; Monu Bedi, 
Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 1809, 1880 (2014); William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 58. 
270 Alejandro Crawford & Lisa Chau, Why Google’s Business Model Works, U.S. NEWS (June 25, 
2013, 10:35 AM) http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/06/25/why-
googles-business-model-works [https://perma.cc/SY88-RWB5] (“Google makes the vast bulk of its 
revenues from AdWords.”); Robert Hof, Facebook’s New Advertising Model: You, FORBES (Nov. 16, 
2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2011/11/16/facebooks-new-advertising-model-
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companies when they purchase products and services from advertisers, who 
in return remit a portion of that revenue back to Google and Facebook.271 In 
a competitive market, these payments for products and services would 
presumably create no deadweight losses. However, because Google and 
Facebook enjoy market dominance, at least for some products and services, 
they arguably distort those markets to effectively eliminate competitive 
markets, engendering deadweight losses.272 Additionally, deadweight losses 
arise from the opportunity costs consumers incur when high switching 
costs prevent them from adopting superior technologies.273 To the extent 
data-generating patents contribute to high switching costs and market 
dominance, they concomitantly contribute to consumer deadweight 
losses.274 
III. IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING PROBLEMATIC
DATA-GENERATING PATENTS 
Patent holders have likely captured data from their inventions—even 
in different product markets—since the beginning of the patent system in 
the fifteenth century. However, until recently, the collection and analysis of 
this data was generally quite costly and time-consuming, tempering social 
and economic concerns about leveraging patent protection to generate 
information protected by trade secret law. Now, in the era of big data, these 
limitations have been largely removed, and the potential for overreaching 
needs to be seriously reevaluated.275 In the discussion below, we offer ways 
to distinguish problematic from unproblematic data-generating patents, and 
evaluate proposals to mitigate these potential concerns.  
A. Discerning Problematic from Unproblematic
Data-Generating Patents 
As we explained earlier, not all data-generating patents necessarily 
result in net costs. In this Section, we propose criteria that can be used to 
identify potentially problematic data-generating patents. In our evaluation, 
you/#572ed61852aa [https://perma.cc/J923-5EDM] (describing Facebook’s use of advertising to 
generate revenue). 
271 See supra note 270. 
272 See supra Section II.C.2. 
273 See supra Section II.C.2. 
274 See supra Section II.C.2. 
275 See Richards, supra note 159, at 1939 (“Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of 
personal information that can be processed, but because of the ways data in one area can be linked to 
other areas and analyzed to produce new inferences and findings.”); cf. Simon, supra note 159 
(explaining how the rise of “big data” techniques counsel in favor of modifying patent law’s 
obviousness doctrine). 
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we focus on two main factors: expansion into unforeseeable markets and 
the strength of preempting potential competition in these markets. By 
unforeseeable markets, we refer to whether the patent affords the ability to 
collect data in an area that is not directly related to the market covered by 
the patented invention. If the invention allows aggregation of data in 
unforeseeable markets, the likelihood that it is problematic increases. For 
the preemption factor, we propose assessing the magnitude of the effect on 
competition in the market regarding the data, as opposed to the preemptive 
effect of the underlying invention itself. The greater the preemptive effect 
on marketplace competition related to the data, the more likely the 
invention is problematic. In many situations, these two factors will rise and 
fall together. However, as we show, many inventions may only implicate 
one of the factors. Moreover, although there are other factors that may be 
useful in such an analysis, such as the general strength of the patent holder 
in the marketplace, the commercial success of the invention, the size of the 
market, the type of technology involved, and whether the protected data 
implicates issues of major public concern, such as health, security, or 
privacy, we believe these two factors tend to do much of the work in 
determining whether a given data-generating patent is likely to be 
problematic. 
We discuss four scenarios in ascertaining whether a data-generating 
invention may cause concern. Each scenario turns on the level of 
unforeseeability and preemption present in a given data-generating patent 
(or set of patents). See Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1: DATA-GENERATING PATENT SCENARIOS 
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1. Scenario One (High Preemption, Low Unforeseeability).—In the
first scenario, the invention at issue allows collection of data in markets 
that are closely related to the invention, but the preemptive effect of the 
patent may be so great that the costs of allowing the patent holder to 
maintain the data generated by the invention secret may be unduly high. 
For example, take the Myriad patent related to screening for 
susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer.276 Myriad’s use of the data it 
collects to improve on its invention, including reducing the number of 
variants of unknown significance, is arguably directly related to the market 
of the underlying invention.277 Even using the data to engage in additional 
cancer research and discovery, such as other types of breast cancer, would 
be closely related to the area of the patented invention, and thus 
foreseeable.278 Google’s use of data obtained through the patented 
PageRank technology to provide personalized search results, for example, 
is similar to the Myriad case in that it is arguably foreseeable.279 
The main reason that these types of inventions may be problematic, 
however, is their highly preemptive nature. Such preemption may or may 
not turn heavily on the presence of patent protection. When broad 
preemptive scope is directly related to relevant data-generating patents, 
absent technological strides to design around the scope of the patents, the 
effect on competition in the market regarding the data is essentially 
preclusive during the twenty-year exclusivity period.280 Although 
aggregating data may lead to increased efficiencies, it may also result in 
more limited data analysis and improvements resulting from the data by the 
patentee or third parties.281 Additionally, when the ability to generate the 
data is exclusively in the hands of one provider, the ability to assess the 
quality of any claims by the data aggregator is limited.282 As discussed 
earlier, after the patent expires or is invalidated, later entrants play a costly 
and extensive game of catch-up.283 
In terms of the additional factors we mention above, the patent holder 
of a data-generating patent with a highly preemptive effect will usually 
276 See supra Section II.A.1. 
277 See supra Section II.A.1. 
278 See generally Eleonore Pauwels, Opinion, Our Genes, Their Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/our-genes-their-secrets.html?_r=0 [https://perma. 
cc/VZ4T-XGZV] (describing how Myriad’s database might be used for related cancer research). 
279 See supra Section II.A.2. 
280 See supra Section II.B.2. 
281 See supra Section II.B.3. 
282 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 99, at 1317 (describing how patents can prevent third-party 
assessment of an invention). 
283 See supra Section II.C.2. 
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have unparalleled strength in the marketplace.284 The commercial success of 
the invention and the size of the market will depend on the value that the 
data-generating patent provides to interested consumers.285 In the case of 
genetic testing, the market will depend not only on the usefulness of the 
patent to consumers, but also on the likelihood of insurance coverage.286 
With regard to the technology involved, the data generated in the genetic 
testing space will have an impact on privacy and public health, which are 
serious public concerns to consider in determining if the data-generating 
patent is problematic.287 In general, determining whether a data-generating 
patent in this scenario is problematic will often require resorting to these 
kinds of other factors.288  
2. Scenario Two (High Preemption, High Unforeseeability).—In the
second scenario, the invention at issue allows the patent holder to gather 
data in an unforeseeable market and the preemptive effect of the patent is 
substantial. Altering a commonly referenced bioethics case study for 
purposes of this discussion, imagine the possibilities for generating data 
from a patent related to genetic testing for susceptibility to diabetes.289 If 
the patent holder used the gathered data to determine that a certain ethnic 
group had a propensity for developing another disease, such as muscular 
dystrophy or schizophrenia,290 the data collected would reach unforeseeable 
markets, unlike the Myriad situation.291 If the patent were of strong 
preemptive effect, this would afford the patent holder market power in 
independent markets during and even after the expiration or invalidation of 
the patent.292 This unforeseeable market power is, by definition, not 
284 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; supra Section II.A.1. 
285 See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
286 See Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support at 43, In re 
BRCA1– and BRCA2–Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (D. Utah 2014) 
(No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS), 2013 WL 7862854, at *23 (discussing the effect of insurance coverage on 
switching costs for genetic testing). 
287 See Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69 (2011) 
(discussing data access and privacy concerns related to public uses of health data). 
288 See supra notes 284–87 and accompanying text. 
289 For purposes of discussing this altered case study, we have also assumed that the researchers 
obtained informed consent from participants. See Michelle M. Mello & Leslie E. Wolf, The Havasupai 
Indian Tribe Case—Lessons for Research Involving Stored Biologic Samples, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
204 (2010) (discussing claims that Arizona State University “researchers improperly used tribe 
members’ blood samples in genetic research”); Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit 
Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/PG2P-SFLZ ] (describing allegations that researchers used 
Havasupai blood to study things other than diabetes, such as mental illness). 
290 See supra note 289.  
291 See supra Section II.A.1. 
292 See supra note 84. 
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contemplated in the scheme of patent rewards and corresponding social 
costs erected by the patent system.293 Given the possibility of over-
rewarding the patent holder in the face of heightened deadweight consumer 
losses, as well as potential downstream barriers to innovation, patents 
falling into this category present the largest potential threat to social 
welfare.294 
Similarly, Google’s use of generated data to engage in targeted 
advertising, for example, may provide it market power wholly unrelated to 
search technology.295 By leveraging its PageRank technology to obtain a 
wealth of data about its users, Google is able to reach into unforeseeable 
secondary markets to offer its business partners a superior way to engage in 
targeted advertising of its users.296 If the PageRank patent is highly 
preemptive in gathering the user data, considering Google’s dominance in 
the search industry, this use of data-generating patents presents potentially 
serious policy concerns.297 
With regard to the other potentially relevant factors, the patent holder 
of a data-generating patent with a highly preemptive effect that allows for 
expansion into secondary markets will usually have dominance in the 
primary (and perhaps secondary) marketplace.298 Because of their 
preemptive and expansive nature, these patents will often be commercially 
successful and affect participants in more than one market.299 As to the 
technology involved, the data generated in both genetic testing and the 
search industry may raise substantial privacy concerns.300 
In sum, the ability to keep the aggregated data as a trade secret is 
likely to prove more problematic than scenario one, because it presents the 
possibility of foreclosing competition not only in the primary market of the 
invention, but also in secondary markets. Expanding the reach of the patent 
into unforeseeable markets seems particularly problematic because it 
293 See supra Section II.B.  
294 See supra Section II.C. 
295 See supra note 145. 
296 Supra note 145. One might wonder why targeted advertising is not a “foreseeable” market 
extension of internet search technology. As noted earlier, by “unforeseeable” we use the narrow legal 
connotation of whether the secondary market is directly related to the primary market. See supra note 
23 and accompanying text. In this sense, targeted advertising would not be a foreseeable extension of 
internet search. 
297 See supra Section II.A.2. 
298 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; supra Section II.A.1. 
299 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; supra Section II.A.1. 
300 See supra note 194; Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1435–38. 
111:377 (2017) Data-Generating Patents 
425 
allows the data-generating patent holder not merely to improve upon the 
patented invention, but broadly to foreclose competition. 
3. Scenario Three (Low Preemption, High Unforeseeability).—For
the third scenario, the invention may only have a weak preemptive effect, 
but the invention allows the patent holder to gather data in an unforeseeable 
market. For example, in the social networking space, Facebook has 
acquired patents related to providing a news feed, though they are arguably 
quite narrow.301 These patented inventions have enabled Facebook to obtain 
information related to its users’ browsing patterns, for example.302  
For one week in 2012, using its patented techniques, Facebook 
directed the news feeds of almost 700,000 of its users to alter the number of 
negative posts they viewed, using the data it collected to evaluate whether 
emotions were contagious on social media.303 Facebook never obtained 
explicit consent for the experiment, relying instead on its users’ prior 
agreement to its Terms of Service, causing an uproar among many 
commentators and users.304  
In this sense, the Facebook newsfeed patent allows the gathering of 
data in unforeseeable markets, such as studying the effects of negative 
inputs on emotion, although it is apparently not particularly preemptive 
given its seemingly narrow scope.305 In simpler terms, there are other viable 
ways to develop the aggregated data, such as through other social 
networking and news media sites, as well as university or industry 
research.306  
The patent holder of a data-generating patent that allows it to reach 
into secondary markets, but with low preemptive effect, does not tend to 
301 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 7,669,123 (filed Aug. 11, 2006) (issued Feb. 23, 2010) (describing 
Facebook’s newsfeed technology); 7,827,208 (filed Aug. 11, 2006) (issued Nov. 2, 2010) (disclosing 
creation of personalized news feeds). 
302 Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php [https://perma.cc/GX8Q-
CWBN] (last modified Sept. 29, 2016).  
303 Adam D.I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion 
Through Social Networks, 111 PNAS 8788 (2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full 
[https://perma.cc/CJA7-LJDL]; Goel, supra note 265. 
304 Goel, supra note 265. 
305 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
306 See, e.g., Alexander H. Jordan et al., Misery Has More Company Than People Think: 
Underestimating the Prevalence of Others’ Negative Emotions, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 120–35 (2011), http://psp.sagepub.com/content/37/1/120.abstract [https://perma.cc/8UY8-
SDED]; Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/ [https://perma.cc/CR6V-
K5QL]. 
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exert dominance in primary or secondary markets.307 Although these 
inventions will often be commercially successful, they are unlikely to raise 
significant concerns because the leverage they provide is minimal.308 If the 
preemptive effect of such a patent is low enough so that it provides 
effectively no leverage to the patent holder in collecting data maintained as 
a trade secret, then it would be no more a concern than collecting data in 
the absence of a patent.309 Indeed, the uproar over Facebook’s manipulation 
of user sentiment arguably had little to do with its newsfeed patent but 
rather with core privacy issues.310 However, as the preemptive capabilities 
rise, the ability to collect data in unforeseen markets presents greater 
concerns, approaching the likely problematic effects of patents falling 
under scenario two (high preemption and high unforeseeability).  
4. Scenario Four (Low Preemption, Low Unforeseeability).—In this
final scenario, an invention with a weak preemptive effect that allows for 
gathering data in a foreseeable market is unlikely to be problematic. For 
instance, a narrow patent covering a very specific method of conducting an 
online survey is unlikely to be preemptive, as there are many alternative 
methods of conducting a survey online.311 Similarly, because surveys are 
designed to gather a wide variety of data, it is unlikely that any use for 
which data is gathered would be unforeseeable.312 The use of the data in 
this way is closely related to the area covered by the patent, and because it 
is not particularly preemptive, it is unlikely to impose social costs in excess 
of its benefits (assuming it was properly granted).  
B. Proposals to Address Problematic Data-Generating Patents
We have discussed concerns related to problematic data-generating
patents; in this Section, we offer some ways to mitigate their detrimental 
effects. In particular, we suggest and assess a variety of means to address 
potentially detrimental effects of data-generating patents on innovation and 
307 See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1344–45 (2011) (describing how broad patent claims can preempt all uses of 
the claimed invention). 
308 See id. 
309 See id. 
310 See Kramer et al., supra note 303; Goel, supra note 265. 
311 See, e.g., Collecting Survey Data: Internet Surveys, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/u-s-survey-research/collecting-survey-data/ [https://perma. 
cc/L3DG-S3BK]. 
312 Even though foreseeable, these data markets would not concern the invention itself. Thus, to the 
extent the patents were preemptive—specifically, foreclosing alternative methods of gathering such 
data—it could be quite problematic. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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disclosure.313 We evaluate the effects of limiting patentability, mandating 
narrow disclosure or sharing of data, expanding defenses to infringement, 
and restricting available remedies. Although none of the many potential 
remedies we discuss are without downsides, we tend to favor ex post 
solutions—either through private or public actions in the courts, or a 
regulatory arena—that can be tailored to the specific circumstances of a 
problematic data-generating patent.314 
1. Mitigating Innovation-Related Concerns.—As we discussed
earlier, prohibitive switching costs may prevent consumers from choosing 
new market entrants after the patent expires or is invalidated, extending 
deadweight losses.315 Furthermore, concentrating data in one provider may 
hinder improvements, particularly where the patent holder has diminished 
incentives to further innovate, such as when investment in the existing 
infrastructure yields satisfactory financial returns.316 
We suggest and consider some alternatives to mitigate these harmful 
effects when they occur. As an initial matter, not all data-generating patents 
are cause for concern.317 Rather, it is only a subset of those patents—
primarily those that are preemptive in unforeseeable markets (and 
sometimes those that are highly preemptive in foreseeable markets)—that 
may impose substantial social costs.318 Identifying these problematic 
patents ex ante—for instance, at an agency such as the USPTO—will likely 
be costly, difficult, time consuming, and error-ridden.319   
Substantially shortening the patent term or wholly eliminating patent 
protection on data-generating patents would ease the burden at the USPTO, 
313 See supra Part II. In what follows, we assume that the underlying patents were at least arguably 
valid when granted; of course, the acquisition of market power in the presence of invalid patents 
generally results in deadweight losses without sufficient corresponding gains. See Anup Malani & 
Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 639 (2013) (“[I]nvalid 
patents have no upside: they do not encourage innovation, and they impose deadweight losses on 
welfare.”). Nonetheless, invalid data-generating patents can exacerbate the problems we discussed 
previously by allowing the patent holder to retain data as a trade secret, even after invalidation. See 
supra Section II.B. 
314 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1092 (1995) (discussing the role of the courts in the “ex post 
tailoring” of remedies). 
315 See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
316 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 63, at 843, 907–09; Saunders, supra note 246, at 423; Simon, 
supra note 99, at 1317. 
317 See supra Section III.A. 
318 See supra Section III.A. 
319 See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 215, at 1326 (noting how in the context of 
patentable subject matter determinations “gatekeeping theories are necessarily bright-line rules: they 
will both exclude some patents that should be granted and fail to exclude others that should not”). 
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but is unlikely to be optimal.320 A restricted exclusivity period would cabin 
the patent holder’s ability to gather data, but in addition to classification 
problems, it also might have the unintended consequence of nudging 
providers to maintain their data-generating inventions as trade secrets from 
the start, rather than seeking patent protection.321 To be certain, forcing 
data-generating inventions into trade secrecy levels the playing field so that 
these inventors do not enjoy “super-patent” protection that allows them to 
use market power conferred by the patent to achieve dominance in the 
market for data protected by trade secret law.322 In other words, in a pure 
trade secrecy regime, competitors can all use the offensive and defensive 
aspects of trade secret law—including reverse engineering and independent 
discovery—which arguably increases innovation incentives and drives 
down prices.323  
On the other hand, trade secrecy not only would reduce disclosure but 
also could cause providers to take extra precaution in preventing leakage of 
proprietary data-generating methods, such as through increased vertical 
integration, increased usage of nondisclosure and noncompete agreements, 
and segmenting of employees.324 These negative effects could potentially 
reduce innovation more than the social costs otherwise imposed by data-
generating patents. Coupled with the difficulty of classifying harmful data-
generating patents ex ante, shortening patent term does not appear to be a 
viable solution. 
Indeed, for some classes of data-generating inventions, as we 
discussed earlier, the courts have already chosen a similar, but even more 
drastic solution: eliminating patent protection altogether. These categories 
include most medical diagnostic inventions as well as most inventions 
embodying algorithms, which likely includes Google’s PageRank 
methods.325 Eliminating patent eligibility for data-generating inventions, 
even harmful ones, would simply exacerbate the problems of shortening 
320 Cf. Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term 
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2013) 
(suggesting that Congress could “shorten the patent term by three years or even longer” without 
harming innovation). 
321 See generally Schwartz, supra note 41, at 637, 648–52 (“[T]he obvious preference for an IP 
holder is for a long term . . . .”). 
322 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.  
323 See supra Section II.B. 
324 See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets 
(working paper, May 26, 2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2758854 (describing the role of noncompete and non-solicitation agreements and 
alternatives such as vertical integration and segmenting employees).  
325 See supra Section II.B.3. 
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patent term. Of course, there may be other sound reasons for eliminating 
these classes of patentable subject matter,326 but with respect to reducing 
the costs of harmful data-generating patents—and there certainly are 
classes of these inventions that remain patentable327—we do not believe 
such an approach is sensible. 
A second solution would extend the patent misuse defense to bar 
enforcement of data-generating patents that improperly expand the scope of 
the underlying legal rights. This approach would not be as harsh as 
eliminating patentability entirely for data-generating inventions, but could 
yield similar effects.328 Specifically, to the extent that would-be patentees 
for problematic data-generating inventions could predict that their patents 
would be precluded from enforcement, they would opt for trade secrecy, 
presenting similar concerns to those discussed earlier.329 So while 
expanding misuse is preferable to all-encompassing solutions, it is far from 
ideal.330 
A third option would be the expansion of the independent invention 
exception to patent infringement for data-generating patents.331 This 
approach would allow competitors to generate databases similar to the 
data-generating patent holder, as long as competitors did not reverse 
engineer or copy data from the patent holder.332 Congress has successfully 
enacted narrow exceptions to allow for independent invention under the 
America Invents Act.333 However, the independent invention must be in 
commercial use as a process or as a product in a manufacturing process at 
least one year prior to the filing of the patent at issue.334 These limitations 
326 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra Section II.A.3. 
328 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
329 See supra notes 320–25 and accompanying text. 
330 Similarly, expanding antitrust causes of action to allow for affirmative counterclaims to 
enforcement of problematic data-generating patents would not be an optimal solution in our view. See 
USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (“If misuse claims are 
not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not 
rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to try to develop one 
without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating uncertainty.”); Barbara 
Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Fall 2014, 
https://www.aslme.org/media/downloadable/files/links/0/5/05.SUPP_Evans.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RD5D-4FYW] (describing the application of antitrust law to the “data hoarding” problems associated 
with holders of genetic testing patents). 
331 See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (proposing a general independent invention defense to patent 
infringement). 
332 See id. 
333 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012). 
334 See id. 
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could be eliminated so as to allow a general independent invention defense 
before or even after the filing of the relevant patent.335 A benefit of an 
independent invention defense is that it is applied ex post in litigation, so 
courts could tailor the remedy to target socially harmful data-generating 
patents. For instance, the independent invention provision could be 
amended only to apply to “reasonable” uses of the invention, and courts 
could adopt a factor-based test—along the lines of that described earlier—
to determine such uses.336  
Indeed, one could even expand the defense to allow reverse 
engineering of the patented invention so long as it was used to generate 
data that otherwise could not be collected without use of the invention.337 
For example, consider a patent with substantial preemptive effects, such as 
one related to genetic markers, where the exclusivity afforded by the data-
generating patent might foreclose competition for gathering related data.338 
While a reverse engineering exception would allow for competition in the 
market of related genetic data, permitting even a limited exception would 
entail large monitoring costs to ensure that competing data gatherers were 
not using reverse engineering as a pretext for engaging in infringing 
behavior.339 Monitoring the use of patented inventions in this way could be 
challenging, though Congress has adopted similar exceptions in the past, 
such as the use of certain patented inventions for reasons related to the 
submission of information to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).340 
Fourth, for data-generating patents that restrict basic research, such as 
Myriad’s withholding of genotypic and phenotypic information from public 
databases,341 Congress or the courts could adopt an experimental use 
exception to patent infringement for data-generating patents.342 Again, the 
exemption related to FDA approval as well as the exception for medical 
and surgical procedures performed by physicians are potential models for a 
335 See Vermont, supra note 331, at 484–92. 
336 See supra Section III.A. 
337 See supra Section III.A. 
338 See supra Section III.A. 
339 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1650–51 (2002). 
340 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). 
341 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
342 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1074–78 (1989) (discussing “the proper scope of an 
experimental use exemption”); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1203–11 (2000) (proposing a fair use exception for patent law).  
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research-based exemption.343 Similar experimental use exceptions are also 
recognized internationally.344 While Congress might not adopt such an 
exception, the courts could plausibly do so, though they generally have 
been hesitant to broaden the scope of infringement exceptions for 
research.345 Like an independent invention defense, a research exemption 
could be tailored by the courts to apply only to harmful data-generating 
patents.346 
One downside of the independent invention and experimental use 
defenses is that they are complete bars to enforcement, at least in a 
particular lawsuit. If the data-generating patentee is effectively unable to 
enforce its patent against most infringers, such defenses effectively 
function as a denial of patentability altogether. In this situation, the result is 
similar to that described earlier—increased incentives for the inventor to 
retain its invention as a trade secret, with the attendant costs of doing so.  
Another solution that can be applied in litigation—and, thus, tailored 
to harmful data-generating inventions—is placing limits on patent 
remedies.347 Courts, for instance, could limit injunctive relief for infringing 
these types of patents, given the difficulty of reverse engineering and 
independently creating the data generated from them during the exclusivity 
period.348 Considering that these safeguards of trade secret law are virtually 
nonexistent for these types of inventions, courts could carefully adopt a 
343 § 271(e)(1) (creating an infringement exception for activities reasonably related to FDA 
submission); id. § 287(c) (prohibiting patent enforcement of medical and surgical procedures against 
physicians); id. § 273 (expanding the prior use defense under previous law). See generally Peter S. 
Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686565 [https://perma.cc/6AYH-
8LJL] (proposing an exception to trade secret protection for the reporting of illegal activity to trusted 
intermediaries). 
344 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 685, 718–19 (2002) (“The United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Korea and many others expressly
recognize an experimental use exception in their statutory law.”).
345 See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (refusing to expand the 
research exemption to nonprofit activity). 
346 See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
347 See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 
(2014) (discussing reforms in the area of patent remedies); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent 
Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 556–57 (2010) (discussing various approaches to patent remedies). 
348 See supra Section III.A. Of course, courts could also limit damages, but determining the exact 
diminution would be a difficult task. See Sichelman, supra note 347, at 553. Relatedly, for medical 
diagnostic tests, governments could refuse to reimburse data-generating patent holders—at least where 
the patent has expired or has been invalidated—for performing medical tests absent disclosure of the 
underlying data, for instance, to a public database. See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 37, at 587. Such 
a solution is again fairly draconian, and would likely shift the protection of data-generating inventions 
into trade secrecy. See supra notes 320–25 and accompanying text. As such, we are generally averse to 
altering medical payment schemes. See supra notes 320–25 and accompanying text. 
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presumption against granting an injunction, particularly in assessing 
whether the balance of hardships tilts in the infringer’s favor and the 
potential harm to the public interest.349 Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., courts have frequently 
denied injunctions to non-practicing entities (NPEs) and sometimes to 
practicing entities, particularly in the field of information technologies, in 
order to prevent “holdup” and other problems flowing from injunctive 
relief.350 If courts can properly take into account the costs caused by data-
generating patents, yet still award monetary relief sufficient for inventors to 
seek patent protection, this solution could be ideal.351 On the other hand, 
systematic errors in the award of monetary relief could result, like other 
solutions described earlier, in de facto patent ineligibility for many data-
generating inventions. This result would be especially concerning in an 
area where courts have already significantly contracted patent eligibility.  
2. Addressing Disclosure-Related Concerns.—As we have
explained, as a result of patent exclusivity, data-generating inventions 
capture information that will not fall into the public domain after the patent 
has expired or is invalidated. Some of the same potential solutions to data-
generating patents’ innovation-related concerns would mitigate these 
disclosure problems. For instance, the ability to reverse engineer a data-
generating patent would spur the production of otherwise secret 
information by competitors. Here, we examine solutions that more directly 
address disclosure issues. 
One possibility is to force the holder of a harmful data-generating 
patent to publicly disclose the data otherwise protected by trade secret 
law.352 As an initial matter, it would be difficult to enforce such a mandate, 
349 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006). 
350 See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 2002–06 (2016). 
351 See Sichelman, supra note 347, at 520–29 (suggesting eliminating injunctive relief for a broad 
class of patents and parties); Barbara J. Evans, Mining the Human Genome After Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 16 GENETICS IN MED. 504, 506 (2014) (discussing liability 
rule regimes in the context of biomedical data); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually 
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property 
Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 350 (2003) (“[T]he generally weak liability rules 
governing confidential information can produce too much protection for data held in actual secrecy 
because there is, in practice, virtually no functional equivalent of reverse engineering.”).
352 Such an approach is related to Gideon Parchomovsky and Michael Mattioli’s proposal of the 
“semi-patent.” Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 
208 (2011). Specifically, the grant of the semi-patent would be conditioned on the applicant’s 
agreement to publish its research data, both positive and negative, as it relates to the patented invention. 
See id. Our proposal, however, is not that the patent holder be required to publish research data about 
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because the patent holder could disclose a portion of its proprietary data, 
and it would be very costly for regulators to determine whether additional 
data was not disclosed.353 Moreover, without protecting that information as 
a trade secret, the patent holder would have less incentive to generate the 
information, potentially resulting in even less information for the public to 
use than with data-generating patents.354 Plus, the development of 
information that is available may come at a higher cost.355 
A less draconian way to encourage information sharing would be to 
mandate donation of data produced as a result of a data-generating patent to 
a regulatory agency, such as to the FDA or NIH, which would not disclose 
it for a certain period of time.356 A limited period of data exclusivity might 
provide sufficient innovation incentives in this space, much as it has for 
biologics.357 Generally, confidential data submitted during the FDA 
approval process remains behind locked doors.358 Again, some mechanism 
to detect data-generating patents, or even better, problematic data-
generating patents would need to be adopted ex ante, and it may simply be 
too difficult to do so for most technology areas.359 However, patents in 
some technological fields—such as genetic diagnostic tests and internet 
search processes—could include such a high percentage of data-generating 
patents that the costs of classification (and evasion of such by savvy patent 
applicants) may be dwarfed by the benefits of disclosure.360 
the invention; rather, we propose limited disclosure of the independent data generated by use of the 
invention. See infra notes 353–78 and accompanying text. 
353 See, e.g., Michael Mattioli, Data Pools, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2671939 [https://perma.cc/8KRY-JTHU]. 
354 See Lichtman, supra note 71, at 230. 
355 See id. 
356 See, e.g., National Institutes of Health, Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 
51,345–54 (2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/08/28/2014-20385/final-nih-genomic-
data-sharing-policy [https://perma.cc/FRM6-5JWL]; Barbara J. Evans et al., The FDA and Genomic 
Tests—Getting Regulation Right, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2258, 2258, 2262 (2015) (concluding that 
although the FDA currently lacks “the correct set of statutory powers to make genomic technologies 
safe and effective . . . while still fostering innovation,” implementing modest statutory reforms could 
“encourage public–private partnerships to develop and sustain data resources for the right regulation of 
genomic testing”); Price II, supra note 58. 
357 See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We 
Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 449–61 (2012) (describing the 
implications of having statutory exclusivities and patent protection for biologics). 
358 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2012) (prohibiting the disclosure of “any method or process which as a 
trade secret is entitled to protection”).  
359 See supra notes 317–23 and accompanying text. 
360 See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 215, at 1327 (“[G]atekeeping rules don’t 
have very clear lines; subject matter category delineation is notoriously elusive . . . .”). 
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In the area of federally funded research, agencies could mandate such 
limited disclosure without intervention from Congress.361 To foster 
disclosure, some have suggested amending the Bayh-Dole Act or 
increasing the authority of the NIH to ensure availability of information 
that is critical to public well-being.362 Recently, the NIH has instituted 
requirements for sharing human genomic data generated by NIH-funded 
research, although the data remains sequestered for a substantial period of 
time after submission, after which point it is made available through a 
tiered distribution system.363 Nonetheless, more stringent disclosure 
requirements would face strong industry opposition, monitoring and 
compliance challenges, and may too greatly affect innovation incentives,364 
although empirical evidence is lacking to draw a conclusion.365  
Along these lines, public or public–private partnerships could 
incentivize the collection and analysis of data.366 Considering the use of 
361 See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY (5th ed. 2001). 
362 See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 294 (2003) (discussing administrative obstacles the NIH faces in 
intervening); Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue - Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 309, 341 (2007) (“[T]o date no such petition has resulted a grant of march-in rights by 
the federal government.”); Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What We 
Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320, 323 (2006) (noting that attempts to amend Bayh-Dole 
typically have not succeeded). Although the Bayh-Dole Act does not cover data per se, as we have 
explained, patents may effectively block full use of the data. See supra Section II.A; Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1187, 1189 (2006) (“[T]he Bayh-Dole Act . . . does not directly address the dissemination of
unpatentable data . . . .”). So although federal agencies could mandate release of data that result from
federally funded projects, full use of the data by third parties would in some cases require the Bayh-
Dole Act to be amended to allow use of related patents. See supra Section II.A.
363 National Institutes of Health, Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51345-54 
(2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/08/28/2014-20385/final-nih-genomic-data-
sharing-policy [https://perma.cc/TS6L-5FT4]. 
364  See Saunders, supra note 246, at 439–40 (discussing concerns about reducing incentives in 
disclosure and the development of inventions). 
365 Along these lines, but rarely used in the United States, compulsory licensing of the data could 
provide for broader information sharing. See, e.g., Torrance, supra note 362, at 336–40. Again, 
however, such approaches could unduly reduce incentives to patent, channeling data-generating 
inventions into trade secrecy. See supra notes 320–25 and accompanying text. Additionally, requiring 
the disclosure of proprietary data may, under some circumstances, constitute a taking requiring just 
compensation. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003, 1005 (1984) (finding that 
Monsanto’s “interest in its health, safety, and environmental data [is] cognizable as a trade secret 
property right” and discussing “several factors that should be taken into account when determining 
whether a governmental action” rises to the level of a taking). 
366 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 330 (evaluating a variety of public and private efforts with regard to 
data sharing); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH DATA INITIATIVE: STRATEGY AND 
EXECUTION PLAN 9 (2013), https://www.healthdata.gov/blog/health-data-initiative-strategy-execution-
plan-released-and-ready-feedback [https://perma.cc/2W4U-JRGJ] (describing the Health Data 
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data about consumers as part of the public infrastructure would encourage 
investment in its development.367 Congress could enact legislation or the 
courts could impose a remedy in trade secret law similar to the “essential 
facilities” doctrine in antitrust to ensure that markets and the public would 
have access to critical information.368 Like forcing information disclosure, 
however, it would seem too difficult to apply such an approach in practice 
to all but a narrow class of inventions.369 Another option would be for the 
government to encourage the voluntary adoption of such sharing 
arrangements.370 These forms of data aggregation are rare in the United 
States, but they have enjoyed more success internationally; perhaps 
financial and other encouragement could increase their use domestically.371 
Nonetheless, given the strong financial incentives to avoid such voluntary 
arrangements, and difficulty in standardization, we do not view them as 
likely to solve a major share of problems created by harmful data-
generating patents.372 
A sui generis form of protection for data, such as that adopted by the 
European Union, would potentially encourage data-generating patent 
holders to disclose their information and charge for its use.373 However, 
database protection in Europe is typically in the context of information that 
must be disclosed for its holder to monetize it—for instance, a database of 
Consortium); Press Release, Ambry Genetics, Ambry Genetics Launches AmbryShare, the Largest 
Disease-Specific Public Database of Sequenced Human Genomes, Increasing the Understanding of 
Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer 10 Fold (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://share.ambrygen.com/news/detail/1/ambry-genetics-launches-ambryshare-the-largest-disease-
specific-public-database-of-sequenced-human-genomes-increasing-the-understanding-of-hereditary-
breast-and-ovarian-cancer-10-fold [https://perma.cc/G5F8-82DB] (releasing “anonymized, aggregated 
data of 10,000 human genomes” and committing to “potentially contributing data from almost 200,000 
genomes annually based on projections”). 
367 See Price II, supra note 89, at 419; BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL
VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 137 (2012).  
368 See Evans, supra note 330, at 62 (noting that “the doctrine [is] technically alive, albeit 
eviscerated, in Supreme Court jurisprudence”). 
369 See supra notes 357–65 and accompanying text. 
370 See Cook-Deegan, supra note 37, at 587–88. 
371 See supra notes 356–67 (examining structures to encourage data sharing); Francis S. Collins et 
al., The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 300 SCIENCE 286–90 (2003) 
(discussing the race to sequence the human genome by the Human Genome Project, a public–private 
partnership, and Celera Genomics, a private firm). 
372 See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 89, at 545 (“[D]ata is often recorded and published in a wide 
variety of formats.”); Turna Ray, In Tackling the VUS Challenge, Are Public Databases the Solution or 
a Liability for Labs?, GENOMEWEB (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.genomeweb.com/clinical-
genomics/tackling-vus-challenge-are-public-databases-solution-or-liability-labs [https://perma.cc/U59E 
-LLQP] (discussing how some public variant genomic databases do not “adopt a consistent evidence-
based standard for variant interpretation” and are not updated regularly).
373 See Mattioli, supra note 89, at 580. 
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names, addresses, and emails for sale to marketers.374 Given that the 
information produced by data-generating patents can be profitably 
maintained as a trade secret, it is unlikely that sui generis protection would 
affect behavior.375 Moreover, protecting databases in this way has been 
seriously considered in the past but not accepted in this country.376 
Although this type of system would not require an explicit allocation of 
government resources, users still bear its costs, both in terms of expenses 
and limitations on access.377 In addition, privatizing data in this way would 
limit the ability to build upon and improve the data, similar to the problems 
described earlier with providing trade secret protection for the data 
generated as a result of leveraged patents.378 
Similarly, prizes, tax breaks, or other rewards might provide sufficient 
incentives to innovate in this area without many of the downsides of 
patents, but they also are not without costs.379 For instance, potential users 
of an invention will often bear its costs regardless of whether a patent or a 
prize provides the incentive for its creation.380 Notwithstanding the issue of 
cost, data-generating patents seem particularly ill-suited for non-patent 
rewards.381 Data-generating patents, which may have preemptive effects 
and be leveraged to collect data in unforeseeable secondary markets, are 
likely to be quite difficult for the government to value accurately ex ante.   
3. Tailoring Solutions Based on Facts and Further Empirical
Research.—In sum, each potential solution to innovation and
disclosure-related concerns has potentially significant limitations. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that most of the ex ante solutions—such as 
limiting patent term or narrowing patent eligibility—suffer from large error 
374 See Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (discussing the rights of database producers), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31996L0009 [https://perma.cc/99LJ-
AM6U]. 
375 See supra Section II.B.3. 
376 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases 
in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 171 (1997).   
377 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 312 (2013); Price II, supra note 89, at 467. 
378 See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text. 
379 See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 377, at 310–13; Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual 
Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014). There are other doctrinal 
and regulatory mechanisms for dealing with the privacy- and health-related concerns with aggregating 
medical data, though here we focus on the specific costs potentially imposed by data-generating patents. 
See Evans, supra note 287, at 77–82. 
380 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 377, at 349–50. 
381 See id. at 333–35 (discussing the cost and benefits of ex ante solutions); Richard A. Posner, 
Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 59 (2005) 
(“Calculating the optimal reward is difficult . . . .”). 
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costs, as well as potentially substantial downstream costs in channeling 
these inventions into trade secrecy. As such, we disfavor them, particularly 
for innovation-related concerns. Mandatory disclosure of information 
produced by a narrow class of easily identifiable data-generating inventions 
might suffer less from these concerns, but without more information on the 
potentially negative effects on innovation incentives and the feasibility of 
monitoring compliance, we disfavor such solutions.  
As for the ex post solutions, the options of enhanced independent 
invention, reverse engineering, and experimental use defenses—as well as 
limited denials of injunctive relief perhaps coupled with mandatory 
disclosure in extreme cases—could be promising if courts can properly 
tailor these remedies. Agencies can also implement ex post solutions, 
especially in the area of disclosure. For instance, one possibility would be 
to require contribution to a confidential government repository of data for 
certain classes of data-generating inventions, such as medical diagnostic 
tests, with release only after sufficient agency study of the information and 
its economic effects. 
Ultimately, whether any of these solutions can be adequately 
implemented will depend on the competency of legislatures, courts, and 
agencies. Such competency can arguably be improved with more empirical 
study on the economic effects of data-generating patents. Here, we have 
begun that process by recognizing the problem of data-generating patents, 
with an eye towards potential solutions and further study. 
CONCLUSION 
We have discussed data-generating patents as a unique illustration of 
patents and trade secrets acting as economic complements. Data-generating 
patents, which by design generate valuable data by their use, may provide 
the patentee market power not just over the invention, but also over data 
generated by it. Trade secret law affords further protection for the 
generated data, even where the underlying patent allows its holder to 
preempt use or collection of the data in unforeseeable markets. Although 
the use of patents and trade secrets in this way may sometimes result in 
increased efficiency or provide additional innovation incentives in areas 
where they may be sorely lacking, in other circumstances they may 
produce detrimental effects. We have set forth factors for identifying 
potentially problematic data-generating patents and offered suggestions to 
mitigate the potential harm to innovation and disclosure that may result 
from their use. We hope our discussion serves as a useful starting point for 
future research into this complex intersection of intellectual property law 
and big data. 
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